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ABSTRACT  __________________________________________________________________________ 
A Welfare-to-Work (WTW) program is a mix of government expenditures on “passive” (unemployment 
insurance, social assistance) and “active” (job search monitoring, training, wage taxes/subsidies) labor 
market policies targeted to the unemployed. This paper provides a dynamic principal-agent framework 
suitable for analyzing the optimal sequence and duration of the different WTW policies, and the dynamic 
pattern of payments along the unemployment spell and of taxes/subsidies upon re-employment. First, we 
show that the optimal program endogenously generates an absorbing policy of last resort (that we call 
“social assistance”) characterized by a constant lifetime payment and no active participation by the agent. 
Second, human capital depreciation is a necessary condition for policy transitions to be part of an optimal 
WTW program. Whenever training is not optimally provided, we show that the typical sequence of poli-
cies is quite simple: the program starts with standard unemployment insurance, then switches into moni-
tored search and, finally, into social assistance. Only the presence of an optimal training activity may 
generate richer transition patterns. Third, the optimal benefits are generally decreasing or constant during 
unemployment, but they must increase after a successful spell of training. In a calibration exercise based 
on the U.S. labor market and on the evidence from several evaluation studies, we use our model to ana-
lyze quantitatively the features of the optimal WTW program for the U.S. economy. With respect to the 
existing U.S. system, the optimal WTW scheme delivers sizeable welfare gains, by providing more insur-
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 1 Introduction
Public expenditures on labor market policies targeted to the unemployed average 3% of GDP, across OECD
countries (Martin, 2002). These policies face a delicate trade-oﬀ between providing unemployed workers with
consumption insurance and re-employment incentives. In order to strike the right balance, governments use a
wide range of policy instruments which, broadly speaking, can be divided into “passive” and “active” policies.
Two thirds of these expenditures are allocated to passive policies, mainly unemployment insurance and
social assistance policies providing income support of last resort once unemployment beneﬁts have expired. The
remaining third is allocated to active policies, like job-search monitoring, training, and wage subsidies. Typi-
cally, job-search monitoring programs pair the unemployed worker with a public employee (the “caseworker”)
who veriﬁes her job-search activity, and often helps with improving interviewing skills and selecting suitable job
vacancies. Training programs tend to be one of three types: basic education (brush-up courses for individuals
with poor literacy and numerical skills, preparation for high-school level diplomas), vocational training (class-
room training in speciﬁc occupational skills) and temporary jobs (publicly funded employment in non-proﬁt
organizations or government agencies). Interestingly, the share of expenditures on active labor market pro-
grams has risen substantially over the past 10 years, and this type of government intervention is now a pivotal
ingredient of social welfare policies.
It is instructive to consider how these various policy instruments have been assembled together in the United
States and in the United Kingdom. In the United States, since 1935 there exists an unemployment insurance
system with vast coverage which replaces on average 60% of the pre-displacement wage. Upon expiration of the
unemployment compensation (usually after 26 weeks), other forms of ﬁnancial support become available. The
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program is the most notable example. With the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunities Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996, the federal U.S. government
limited the payment of TANF beneﬁts to a maximum of 5 years–with tighter limits in several states–and imposed
strict participation requirements to active labor market programs for welfare recipients. Broadly speaking, two
types of programs have been put in place: “human capital development” programs where the emphasis is on
training and skill formation, and “labor force attachment” programs, where the focus is on assistance and
monitoring during job search. The Food Stamps program represents the main form of social assistance, once
the TANF beneﬁts have expired. Finally, the Earned Income Tax Credit, introduced by the federal government
in 1975, represents today the major wage subsidy program for low-income workers (see Moﬃtt, 2003, for a
survey of the U.S. welfare system).
An example of a more structured mix of passive and active policies is the U.K. “New Deal,”a mandatory
program for all the unemployed workers introduced in 1998. Formally, the New Deal is organized in four
sequential stages. Stage 1 consists of a standard unemployment insurance policy lasting 6 months for younger
workers and 2 years for older workers. In stage 2 (the “gateway”), a personal adviser regularly meets with the
1worker to assist with and monitor her job search. If after four months the worker is still unemployed, she moves
to stage 3 (the “options”) where she enters training for up to one year. At the end of the training program, the
worker enters stage 4 (the “follow-through”), another period of job-search assistance/monitoring. Also the U.K.
welfare system contains an assistance policy of last resort, called Income Support. Finally, the U.K. system
features a large earnings subsidy program for poor households, the Working Family Tax Credit (see Blundell
and Meghir, 2001, for an overview of the U.K. system).
It is useful to note, at this point, two common features of the U.K. and the U.S. Welfare-to-Work programs,
shared by many other countries as well. First, active policies tend to be implemented after an initial spell of
unemployment insurance. Second, policies of pure social assistance (like Food Stamps) are usually ordered last
in the sequence of policy interventions.
A Welfare-to-Work (WTW) program is precisely a government expenditure program that combines together
passive and active policies, as in the U.S. and the U.K. examples. Clearly, every WTW program implicitly
promises a certain level of ex-ante welfare to the unemployed agent. An optimal WTW program is a mix of
policies that maximizes the expected discounted utility of the unemployed agent, subject to the constraint of
not exceeding a given level of government expenditures. The fundamental trade-oﬀ to be solved in the design
of an optimal WTW program is the one between oﬀering consumption insurance and eliciting the right eﬀort
level in the search or training activity.
The ﬁrst objective of this paper is to develop a theoretical framework suitable to study the key features of
optimal WTW programs. Our point of departure is the classic setup–originated largely from the seminal article
of Shavell and Weiss (1979)–where the optimal unemployment insurance contract is studied in the presence
of a repeated moral hazard problem: the risk-neutral principal (planner/government) cannot observe the risk-
averse unemployed agent’s job search eﬀort (hidden action).1 Following the most recent contributions in the
literature (Wang and Williamson, 1996; Hopenhayn and Nicolini, 1997; Zhao, 2001; Pavoni, 2003a), we build
on the seminal insights of Spear and Srivastava (1987) and Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1990) to exploit
the recursive representation of the planner’s problem where the expected discounted utility promised by the
contract to the unemployed agent becomes a state variable.
We generalize this standard setup in two directions. First, following Pavoni (2003b), we let workers’ wages
and their job ﬁnding probabilities depend on human capital (skills) and allow human capital to depreciate
along the unemployment spell. Human capital is our second key state variable in the recursive representation.
Second, we enrich the economic environment of the standard setup with the introduction of a costly monitoring
1Bailey (1978), Flemming (1978) and more recently Fredricksson and Holmlund (2001) and Acemoglu and Shimer
(1999) follow a diﬀerent approach. They study economies where search eﬀort is observable (i.e., there is no moral hazard)
and model unemployment insurance as the optimal policy of a benevolent government that chooses the beneﬁt level (not
the entire time-path) associated to the welfare-maximizing labor market equilibrium. Recently, Saez (2002) and Laroque
(2005) have analyzed the optimality of certain income maintenance programs in the U.S. and France within static models
where the worker type is private information.
2technology that can be used to observe the worker’s search eﬀort and of a costly skill accumulation technology
that can be used to slow down depreciation and, possibly, increase the level of human capital.2
The introduction of human capital depreciation in the problem permits a better representation of labor
market data along two important dimensions. First, since wages depend on human capital, in our economy
workers experience wage losses upon separation, consistently with the ﬁndings of a vast set of empirical studies
(Bartel and Borjas, 1981; Ruhm, 1991; Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan, 1993; for a survey, see Fallick, 1996).
Note that in this literature, unemployment duration is often found to have an independent negative impact on
re-employment earnings, beyond job-speciﬁc and occupational-speciﬁc skill losses (e.g., Addison and Portugal,
1989; Neal, 1995). Second, since we let the job-ﬁnding probability depend on human capital, search eﬀort
becomes less eﬀective as the unemployment spell progresses, inducing negative duration dependence in the
unemployment hazard–a common feature of the data, as reported by Machin and Manning (1999) in their
survey. In particular, several studies (e.g., Blank, 1989, for welfare recipients; Bover, Arellano and Bentolila,
2002, for UI beneﬁts recipients) continue ﬁnding a rapidly declining hazard even after explicitly controlling
for unobserved heterogeneity. Moreover, the existence of human capital depreciation during unemployment
represents a potential reason for training policies to be part of an optimal WTW program.3
As discussed earlier, job-search monitoring and training policies are key components of actual WTW
schemes. The standard setup (e.g., Hopenhayn and Nicolini, 1997) is unable to address the optimality of
such important policy instruments. Enriching the economic environment to include the monitoring and human
capital accumulation technologies implies that, along the optimal contract, the planner may ﬁnd it optimal to
make use of them.
The second objective of the paper is to study quantitatively the features of the optimal WTW program
for the typical welfare recipient in the U.S. economy and contrast them to the actual welfare system. There
is an extended econometric literature on the evaluation of active labor market programs (for surveys, see
LaLonde, 1995; Meyer, 1995; Heckman, LaLonde and Smith, 1999; Moﬃtt, 2003) which provides useful guidance
on the eﬀectiveness of diﬀerent types of interventions, but cannot address the complex question of how to
design a government program which combines various instruments and follows the worker throughout her non-
employment experience. We use our framework in an attempt to answer this question for the U.S. labor market.
We calibrate the parameters of our model to match some key labor market statistics. In so doing, we exploit
2Extending Atkeson and Lucas (1995), Alvarez and Ayiagari (1995) study the optimal level of random monitoring of
agents’ reports on job oﬀers and the long-run stationary distribution of consumption in a pure adverse-selection selection
setup with temporary (one-period) job oﬀers, and no human capital dynamics. Recently, Boone et al. (2002) have
addressed the issue of the optimality of job-search monitoring within a structural search model of the labor market.
They numerically compute the optimal level of monitoring in an economy where every worker is subject to the same
monitoring probability. Therefore, they do not fully solve for the optimal contract where the use of each instrument is
history-dependent, as we do. Their simpler framework has clearly some other advantages, for example they can study
general equilibrium eﬀects which we abstract from.
3Skill depreciation is also a central ingredient in a popular explanation of the comparative unemployment experience
of the U.S. and Europe (e.g., Ljungqvist and Sargent, 1998).
3information from the evaluation of several recent U.S. active labor market programs. Next, we solve numerically
for the optimal program and, by simulation, derive the optimal sequence of policies, their duration, the pattern
of optimal beneﬁts, taxes and subsidies. Finally, we calculate the welfare gains for the worker and the budget
savings for the government of shifting from the current scheme to the optimal scheme.
1.1 A Preview of the Main Results
The planner’s recommendations on eﬀort choices and on the use of the costly available (search monitoring
and skill accumulations) technologies map naturally into four distinct policy instruments: 1) unemployment
insurance, where the planner elicits positive search eﬀort from the agent; 2) job search monitoring, where the
planner can observe the search eﬀort upon payment of a cost; 3) training, where the planner pays a cost to slow
down human capital depreciation; and 4) social assistance, deﬁned as an income-assistance program of “last
resort” with the planner inducing zero search eﬀort and simply insuring the worker. Moreover, as in Hopenhayn
and Nicolini (1997), by choosing an agent’s consumption during employment, the planner implicitly sets wage
taxes and subsidies.
Our qualitative characterization of the optimal WTW program yields four main results. First, in absence of
human capital depreciation, the optimal program does not contemplate switching between policy instruments:
the program may select initially diﬀerent policies for workers with diﬀerent human capital levels, but each policy
is absorbing within the unemployment spell.
Second, with human capital depreciation, when training is not chosen, the typical policy sequence in the
optimal WTW program starts from unemployment insurance, switches into job-search monitoring, and then
turns into social assistance, which remains the only absorbing policy. The faster the human capital depreciation,
the more rapidly the optimal WTW program transits between policy-phases. When the optimal program
involves training, the possible policy transitions of the program are richer, so we resort to numerical simulations
for a full characterization.
Third, we can entirely describe the dynamics of the government transfers and taxes/subsidies associated
to each policy phase of the program. Under social assistance and job-search monitoring, beneﬁts are constant
because of full insurance, while due to the presence of the incentive constraint they are decreasing both during
unemployment insurance and after an unsuccessful spell of training. After a successful training phase, the
optimal beneﬁts must increase.
Fourth, the nature of re-employment wage taxes and/or subsidies is largely determined by competing forces
which we explain intuitively. One fairly general result is that, as the optimal program approaches the monitoring
phase, earnings subsidies become more and more likely, and during job-search monitoring the subsidy tends
to increase with duration. This ﬁnding, which is linked to human capital depreciation, contrasts with the
4well-known result of Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) who uncover that, in an economy without human capital
dynamics, taxes should rise with the length of the unemployment spell.
For expositional simplicity, in the benchmark model we make the usual assumption in this literature that
the planner fully controls the consumption stream of the agent. This precludes the occurrence of self-insuring
trades in the asset market. Recently, several authors have begun to analyze dynamic moral hazard models with
hidden savings (Werning, 2002; Kocherlakota, 2003; Shimer and Werning, 2003; Abraham and Pavoni, 2004).
In an extension of the benchmark model where the agent can anonymously access a credit market, we show
that if the agent faces a no-borrowing constraint, the allocations induced by the same optimal contract can be
implemented with the help of one simple additional instrument: a linear, time-invariant interest tax.
When we use our theoretical framework to study the optimality of the current U.S. welfare system, we ﬁnd
that, compared to the existing scheme, the optimal program should feature more job-search monitoring and less
basic adult training. This result agrees with a vast empirical evaluation literature that ﬁnds adult training (for
surveys, see Heckman, LaLonde and Smith, 1999; Heckman and Carneiro, 2002) rather ineﬀective, with few
exceptions. Moreover, we ﬁnd that the current WTW scheme should provide more insurance for skilled workers
and more incentives for unskilled workers.
The size of the welfare gains of switching from the current scheme to the optimal program varies across skill
type. High-skill workers who rejoin the employment ranks quickly have small gains, around 1% of lifetime con-
sumption; however, low-skill workers with long durations can achieve gains beyond 8% of lifetime consumption.
Also budget savings for the government are substantial: the optimal program would reduce public expenditures
between 4% and 50%, depending on the worker’s human capital level.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the economic environment (available to the
agent in autarky). Section 3 describes the contractual relationship between planner and agent, and presents the
recursive formulation of the planner’s problem. Section 4 characterizes the key features of the optimal WTW
program. In Section 5 we analyze the implementation of the optimal contract with access to credit markets.
Section 6 develops the quantitative analysis applied to the U.S. labor market. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 The Economy
Preferences: Workers have period utility over consumption c and eﬀort a given by u(c) ¡ a: Preferences are
time-separable and the future is discounted at rate ¯ 2 (0;1). We impose that c ¸ 0, and that u(¢) is strictly
increasing, strictly concave and smooth, with limc!1 u0(c) = 0. A technical assumption that will prove useful
in our characterization is that the ﬁrst derivative of u¡1 is convex. This condition is satisﬁed by a wide range of
utility functions, including the CRRA class with risk-aversion parameter greater than one half, and the entire
5CARA class.4
Employment status and eﬀort: The agent can be either unemployed (z = zu) or employed (z = ze).
During unemployment, she can either search or train–these two activities are mutually exclusive within a period–
and search/training eﬀort can be either low or high, i.e., a 2 f0;eg; with e > 0. Employment is assumed to be
an absorbing state with zero disutility of eﬀort (a = 0):5
Human capital: Workers are endowed with a time-varying stock of human capital (skills) h ¸ 0. During
unemployment, if search or training fails, human capital depreciates geometrically at a constant rate ± 2 [0;1].
During employment or after a successful spell of training, human capital accumulates. Let y denote the outcome
of the worker activity (search/train) during unemployment, with y 2 fs;fg, where s denotes “success”, and f
denotes “failure”. Then,
hs = Ah® + (1 ¡ ±)h, with ® 2 [0;1] and A ¸ 0; (1)
hf = (1 ¡ ±)h: (2)
Production technology: An employed worker of type h produces output ! (h). We let ! (¢) be a con-
tinuous and increasing function, with !(h) 2 [0;!max] and !(0) = 0. During employment, human capital
accumulates through the law of motion (1) at no cost (e.g., through learning-by-doing).
Search technology: During search, both eﬀort a and human capital h aﬀect the job ﬁnding probability
of an unemployed worker. Denote the unemployment hazard rate as ¼ (h;a). We assume that ¼ (h;0) ´ 0 and
that ¼ (¢;e) ´ ¼ (¢) 2 (0;1) is continuous and increasing.
Training technology: The unemployed worker can choose to forego the search option and operate a
training technology to accumulate human capital, upon payment of a cost ·TR > 0. The training technology
requires the unobservable worker’s eﬀort to succeed, but its outcome is stochastic: with probability µ(a), where
µ(e) > µ(0) = 0, training is successful, and the worker’s human capital next period accumulates following (1).
Upon failure, human capital depreciates according to (2):
Insurance and credit markets: During unemployment the agent is subject to a random event she would
like to (self-) insure against: the outcome y of her search/training activity, which aﬀects both her employment
status and her level of human capital, thus her future income. In the baseline model, we study the optimal
contract when the worker has no access to storage, insurance or credit markets–in particular we abstract from
self-insurance. In Section 5, we will relax this assumption and explore how the same allocations implied by the
optimal contract can be implemented when workers have anonymous access to the credit market.
4Newman (1995) highlights the role of the curvature of the ﬁrst derivative of the cost function for the principal (the
inverse of the agent’s utility function) in a static moral hazard model of entrepreneurship.
5In the quantitative section we also study the case where during work the agent suﬀers a positive eﬀort cost a = e.
6It is useful to further discuss some of the assumptions we made in laying out our economic environment. The
discrete eﬀort choice is coherent with a long tradition in labor economics and macroeconomics which stresses
the importance of ﬁxed costs and the extensive margin in participation decisions (e.g., Cogan, 1981). The
assumption that employment is an absorbing state is made, as in Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997), to focus the
analysis of the optimal dynamic contract to the unemployment experience.6 The absence of eﬀort cost and the
presence of learning-by-doing on the job suﬃce to ensure that the value of employment always dominates the
value of remaining unemployed so that no job oﬀer is turned down. These two assumptions have no bearing
on the qualitative characterization of the optimal WTW program during unemployment and can be relaxed, as
long as employment remains dominant.
The monotonicity of ¼ in h is a natural property, consistent with the overwhelming evidence that unemploy-
ment duration is longer for workers with lower pre-displacement wage (e.g., Meyer 1990). Strictly speaking, it is
a “reduced form” that can be microfounded, for example, in a model where skilled workers have access to wider
labor market opportunities, or in a model where productivity on the job is positively correlated with search
skills. This monotonicity, together with skill depreciation, induces duration dependence in the unemployment
hazard.7
Our speciﬁcation of ¼ also displays complementarity between the stock of human capital h and the search
eﬀort level a: increasing eﬀort has a larger impact on the hazard rate the larger the level of h. Bover, Arellano
and Bentolila (Table 4, 2002) document that the receipt of beneﬁts signiﬁcantly reduces the hazard rate of leaving
unemployment and this eﬀect tends to fade away as the unemployment spell progresses (and h depreciates). It
is logical to associate the receipt of beneﬁts with a lower search eﬀort, thus their ﬁnding provides a possible
foundation for our complementarity assumption.
3 The Contractual Relationship
We now introduce a risk-neutral planner/government (principal) who faces an intertemporal budget constraint
with a real interest factor equal to ¯
¡1. At time t = 0, the planner oﬀers the unemployed worker (agent) an
insurance/credit contract that maximizes the expected discounted stream of net revenues (ﬁscal revenues minus
expenditures) and guarantees the agent at least an expected discounted utility level U0. The value of U0 should
be thought of as an exogenous parameter measuring the “generosity” of the welfare system (e.g., the outcome
of voting).
6As long as the layoﬀ rate is exogenous, the qualitative predictions of our model, within the same unemployment spell,
are unchanged. Zhao (2001), and more recently Hopenhayn and Nicolini (2004), introduce a job-separation probability
that is under agents’ control and show that the optimal dynamic contract must also take the employment history into
account.
7None of our analytical results relies on the strict monotonicity of ¼ in h: For example, in Proposition 6, we will
provide a full analytical characterization of the optimal sequence of policies for the case where ¼ is constant (and only
! is aﬀected by h).
7Information structure: The planner can perfectly observe the employment status z; whether the unem-
ployed worker is searching or training, and the outcome y of the latter activity.8 However, the agent’s eﬀort
choice a during both search and training is private information of the agent, so the planner faces a moral hazard
problem.
A search-eﬀort monitoring technology is available to the planner when the worker seeks job opportunities:
upon payment of a cost ·JM > 0, the job-search eﬀort of the agent can be perfectly observed and enforced by
the planner. The monitoring technology can be interpreted as the situation where the planner pays the services
of a “caseworker” who monitors closely the search activity of the agent.9 Such technology is unavailable during
training.10
Contract: In each period t; the contract speciﬁes transfers of resources to the worker, recommendations
on search vs. training activities and on the search/training eﬀort level to exert, and the choice of using
the eﬀort-monitoring technology, when search is suggested. The period t components of the contract are
contingent on all publicly observable histories up to t and, whenever the monitoring technology is not used,
search-eﬀort recommendations must be incentive compatible. The training eﬀort recommendations must always
be incentive compatible. Moreover, at every t, we allow the planner to specify the contract contingent on the
publicly observable realization xt 2 [0;1] of a uniform random variable Xt. We will explain later how this
“randomization” may be used in the optimal contract to convexify the planner’s problem and, thus, enhance
welfare (see also Phelan and Townsend, 1991; and Phelan and Stacchetti, 2001).
The components of the contract as policies of the Welfare-to-Work (WTW) program: The
combination of unmonitored search, monitored search, use of the training technology, together with the high
and low eﬀort recommendations conﬁgures six possible options. Notice ﬁrst that the planner will never choose to
pay the monitoring cost and suggest the minimal eﬀort level. The reason is that, since ¼ (h;0) = 0; the observable
realization of a successful search activity perfectly detects a deviation from the zero-eﬀort recommendation at
no additional cost.11 Moreover, the planner will never choose to pay the training cost and suggest zero eﬀort,
8Since the laws of motion for human capital dynamics are known and deterministic, it is enough knowing the pre-
displacement wage, the occurrence and outcome of training and unemployment duration in order to recover the individual
level of human capital h at every point in the worker’s history.
9Our monitoring technology could be interpreted in a more general way, as “random monitoring”, with one additional
assumption. Suppose that the government observes the agent’s search eﬀort only with some probability q < 1: When
u(0) = ¡1, then if the government threatens to sanction the shirking worker by not paying any beneﬁt, this random
monitoring acts exactly as a perfect monitoring, since the worker will never want to be without consumption for a period.
Such monitoring activity will be essentially identical to ours whenever the monitoring cost has a ﬁxed component bounded
away from zero.
10While certain elements of the learning eﬀort, such as classroom attendance and homework, are easily veriﬁable, there
are other key components, like attention, focus and concentration, that are extremely hard to be veriﬁed by an external
party. It is reasonable to argue that learning is a far more complex activity than job search and, as such, fully monitoring
the training eﬀort is not possible.
11Put diﬀerently, the incentive-compatibility constraint associated to the zero eﬀort recommendation is a trivial one,
since the planner can punish without limits the worker upon ﬁnding a job, an outcome which is oﬀ the equilibrium
induced by the optimal contract.
8since µ(0) = 0 and the cost would be wasted. As a result, the planner is left with four options, which we label
“policy instruments” of the WTW program, and we index with i:
We denote as “Unemployment Insurance” (i = UI) the joint recommendation of search activity and positive
search eﬀort. When positive search eﬀort is suggested together with the use of the monitoring technology, the
policy will be labelled “Job-search Monitoring” (i = JM). The zero-eﬀort recommendation in the search activity
denotes the “Social Assistance” policy (i = SA): A high-eﬀort recommendation with the use of the training
technology describes the “Training” option (i = TR). Finally, during employment, the diﬀerence between the
wage and the planner’s transfer deﬁnes implicitly the employment tax (if positive) or subsidy (if negative).
3.1 Recursive Formulation of the Planner’s Problem
Appendix A describes the sequential formulation of the optimal contract and explains that, following the
recursive contracts literature, the contract can be described through a state vector composed by the expected
discounted utility U promised to the agent by the continuation of the contract and the level of human capital
h of the worker.12
Exploiting this recursive representation, consider an unemployed worker who enters the period with state
(U;h). At the beginning of the period, the planner selects the optimal policy instrument i(U;h) by solving
V (U;h) = max
i2fJM;SA;TR;UIg
V i(U;h); (3)
where the function V is the upper envelope of the values associated to the diﬀerent policies. In choosing a
particular policy, implicitly, the planner also chooses an eﬀort recommendation a(U;h), the transfer c(U;h);
and the continuation utilities Uy (U;h) conditional on the outcome y of the search/training activity. We describe
these additional choices in the next section.
As anticipated, the planner in general may decide to use randomizations through X. In this case, the value












where V (U (x);h) is the upper envelope (3), and the integral constraint in (4) says that the planner is committed
to keep his promises, hence he must deliver to the agent continuation utility U in (ex-ante, with respect to the
shock x) expected value terms.
12Strictly speaking, the employment status z is also a state variable, but since employment is absorbing and presents
no incentive problems, the contract is nontrivial only as long as the worker is unemployed and z = z
u: Therefore, in
what follows, to lighten the notation, we omit z from the state vector.
93.2 The Policies
We now describe in detail the planner problem during employment and during unemployment, under the four
policies we considered.
Employment state (wage tax/subsidy): Consider an employed worker with states (U;h): Since em-
ployment is an absorbing state without informational asymmetries, the planner simply solves
W(U;h) = max
c;Us ! (h) ¡ c + ¯W(Us;hs)
s:t: : (5)
U = u(c) + ¯Us;
where hs is obtained from the law of motion (1). The planner will provide full consumption smoothing for the
agent, thus promised utility is constant over time. The promise-keeping constraint implies that in every period
the optimal transfer ce is constant and satisﬁes ce (U) = u¡1 ((1 ¡ ¯)U). Therefore, the magnitude
¿ (U;h) = ! (h) ¡ ce (U) (6)
is the implicit tax (or subsidy, if negative) the government imposes on employed workers. State-contingent taxes
and subsidies are a key component of an optimal WTW plan.
Unemployment Insurance (UI): When the worker is enrolled by the planner in the unemployment
insurance scheme, the problem of the planner is
V UI(U;h) = max
c;Uf;Us ¡c + ¯
£
¼(h)W(Us;hf) + (1 ¡ ¼(h))V(Uf;hf)
¤
s:t: : (7)
U = u(c) ¡ e + ¯
£
¼(h)Us + (1 ¡ ¼(h))Uf¤
;
U ¸ u(c) + ¯Uf;
where hf is generated through the law of motion (2). The pair
¡
Us;Uf¢
are the lifetime utilities promised
by the planner contingent on the outcome of search (s denotes success and f failure of the search activity).
Given the observability of the employment status, the outcome of search is veriﬁable. For notational simplicity
we have denoted ¼ (h;e) as ¼ (h): The ﬁrst constraint describes the law of motion of the state variable U
(promise-keeping constraint), and the second constraint states that payments have to be incentive compatible.
The expressions for W and V are given by equations (5) and (4), respectively.
Job Search Monitoring (JM): The problem of the planner that chooses to monitor the search eﬀort of
10the agent is
V JM(U;h) = max
c;Uf;Us ¡c ¡ ·JM + ¯
£
¼(h)W(Us;hf) + (1 ¡ ¼(h))V(Uf;hf)
¤
s:t: : (8)
U = u(c) ¡ e + ¯
£
¼(h)Us + (1 ¡ ¼(h))Uf¤
:
Notice the similarity between problem (JM) and problem (UI): the former is identical to (UI) except for the
fact that there is no incentive-compatibility constraint in exchange for the additional per period cost ·JM. This
cost can be interpreted as the salary of the government employee (“caseworker”) who monitors and enforces
the search activity of the unemployed agent, plus the additional administrative expenditures associated to this
task.
Training (TR): The planner can opt to operate the costly stochastic training technology requiring the
unobservable agent’s eﬀort as input. The planner’s problem, when the worker is enrolled in training, is deﬁned
as
V TR(U;h) = max
c;Us;Uf ¡c ¡ ·TR + ¯
£




U = u(c) ¡ e + ¯
£
µUs + (1 ¡ µ)Uf¤
;
U ¸ u(c) + ¯Uf;





The ﬁrst natural interpretation of the training option is formal training. During formal training, workers
improve their literacy and/or numerical skills (basic training), or learn some occupational-speciﬁc skills (voca-
tional training) in the classroom. The cost ·TR is the per-period/per-head cost of administering the training
course, and the probability µ denotes the likelihood of the worker passing the examination or attaining the
degree in any given period. The second interpretation is that of a transitional job: the planner pays ·TR to the
organization employing the worker for one period and providing her with some job-speciﬁc skills. At the end of
the period, the worker is still unemployed, but with probability µ such on-the-job training was successful and
human capital depreciation was contained.
Social Assistance (SA): In social assistance, the worker is “released” by the planner for the current
period, in the sense that the planner does not demand high (search or training) eﬀort, but simply transfers
some income to the worker. The problem of the planner is
V SA (U;h) = max
c;Uf ¡c + ¯V(Uf;hf)
s:t: :
U = u(c) + ¯Uf:
11The expression for V is given by equation (4) and the constraint describes how the promised utility U can be
delivered by a combination of current and future payments.
Below we will prove that if at any point during the contract the planner makes the “zero eﬀort” recommen-
dation, it is optimal to do so from that point onward: SA is an absorbing policy. In light of this characterization,
it is natural to think of SA as a pure income-assistance program of last resort.
In what follows, it is convenient to state some basic properties of these value functions. By inspecting





u¡1 ((1 ¡ ¯)U)
1 ¡ ¯
; (10)
where the ﬁrst term, which can be computed recursively as
Ω(h) = (1 ¡ ¯)! (h) + ¯Ω(hs);
is the discounted value of the stream of wages and the second term is the present value of the constant level of
beneﬁts guaranteed by the planner to an employed worker. It is easy to see that W is a continuous function,
which is decreasing and concave in U; and increasing in h:
By applying fairly standard results in dynamic programming, one obtains the same continuity, monotonicity
and concavity properties for V as well, but two caveats are worth mentioning. First, monotonicity in U is
guaranteed whenever at (U;h) the consumption level c associated to the optimal program is positive (e.g.,
whenever u(0) = ¡1). Second, the concavity of V in U is guaranteed because of the randomization in
(4): In Appendix B (Proposition 0) we report the proof of all such properties. Finally, the properties of V
are inherited by the value functions of each single policy V i: In particular, all the problems deﬁning policies
i 2 fJM;SA;TR;UIg are also concave.
4 The Optimal WTW Program
We are now ready to study the key characteristics of an optimal WTW program. We begin with a discussion
of the economics behind the choice among alternative policies, a useful step to understand two important
preliminary results. First, we demonstrate that dynamics in human capital (accumulation and depreciation)
are a necessary condition for the optimal WTW program to switch between policies. When an individual’s
human capital is constant, the optimal program involves only one policy stage, chosen optimally among JM,
UI or SA, and no transition across policies (i.e., each policy is absorbing). Second, we show that even in the
presence of human capital dynamics, social assistance maintains its absorbing nature.
We then turn to studying the optimal sequence of policies in the model with human capital dynamics. Here
we heavily exploit the recursive formulation of the optimal contracting problem. By projecting the upper enve-
lope (3) on the (U;h) state space, we obtain a graphical representation of which policy is optimally implemented
12at every (U;h) pair. The state space can then be divided into diﬀerent connected areas, each corresponding to
a speciﬁc policy whose value dominates all the others. A key step to this characterization is ranking the slopes
of the value functions V i (U;h) for each policy i with respect to its two arguments. Finally, we describe the
dynamics of the government transfers associated to each policy phase of the program.
4.1 Choosing Among Policies: Economic Forces at Work
Within our model, there are several key economic forces that induce the planner to select one particular policy
over the other three. For ease of exposition, we divide them into costs and returns. We begin by describing the
costs and then move to the returns.
First of all, a planner who wants to implement JM or TR will have to incur certain direct expenses associated
to the administration of the job search monitoring and training technologies (respectively, ·JM and ·TR). The
larger these costs are, the less attractive these two policies appear compared to UI and SA.
Second, the planner must compensate the agent for her eﬀort. Since u is concave, the higher the promised
utility U, the lower the marginal utility of consumption. Hence, the larger the payments of the planner must
be to compensate the worker for the ﬁxed disutility of the search/training eﬀort cost e. This “wealth eﬀect”
makes SA more attractive, compared to UI;JM and TR; for high enough levels of U:
The third cost component is the cost induced by the presence of the incentive compatibility constraint. By
using the promise-keeping constraint, the incentive compatibility constraint during unemployment insurance
can be conveniently reformulated (independently of the unemployment beneﬁt c), as




The diﬀerence between the state-contingent utilities Us and Uf is increasing as h falls, through the hazard rate
¼ (h). Large utility dispersions are associated to large consumption dispersions. Since the agent is risk-averse,
in order to compensate her for the wider spread of payments across states, the planner has to deliver a higher
average transfer for any given promised utility U. In sum, incentive costs for the planner (i.e., resource costs
of satisfying the incentive-compatibility restriction during UI) increase as human capital h depreciates. Note
that this cost is absent in JM and is independent of h in TR (because µ does not depend on h).
Moreover, when the third derivative of u¡1 is positive, the cost of providing the utility lottery associated to
(IC1), in terms of consumption payments of the planner, increases with U. Hence, the incentive costs (during
both UI and TR) increase with the level of promised utility U:13
13To understand this result, consider a static version of our model (hence, abstract from h). Let g ´ u
¡1 and let Ci (U)
be the cost for the planner of delivering utility U under policy i. Then, it is easy to see that CJM(U) = ·
JM +g(U +e):
In UI, from the (binding) IC and PK constraints,
U = ¡e + ¼u(c











13We now turn to the returns associated to each optimal policy. Social assistance has no direct returns for the
planner. In UI and JM, the returns to search in terms of job ﬁnding rate via ¼ (h), and earnings once employed
via ! (h), are increasing in h. Since from (1) hs increases with h; the returns to human capital accumulation
during training are of two types: a higher h raises the eﬀectiveness of future job search in UI and JM and it
reduces the future incentive costs during UI; moreover, it increases earnings upon re-employment.
4.2 The “Absorbing” Nature of Social Assistance
Now, we are ready to state our ﬁrst result. Consider a situation where, along some history, social assistance turns
out to be optimal for the planner. Intuitively, given the absence of IC constraints, during SA the planner oﬀers
full insurance to the agent, and U is constant. Because of depreciation, however, h declines over time. As h gets
smaller, the incentive cost in UI rises and the returns to search and training fall, hence any other alternative
policy becomes less attractive compared to SA, which reinforces the optimality of SA. This mechanism delivers
the following result.
Proposition 1 (SA absorbing): SA is an absorbing policy. That is, if it is chosen at any period t,
choosing it thereafter is optimal.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Proposition 1 already establishes one key property of the optimal sequence of policies in a WTW program,
as it rules out programs where incentive-provision or monitoring is oﬀered after a spell of social assistance.
As discussed in the Introduction, pure income support policies (like Food Stamps in the U.S.) tend to be
interventions of last resort, in accordance with our result.
A consequence of Proposition 1 is that, because of its absorbing nature, and since ¼(h;0) = 0; the equilibrium
value of SA does not depend on h and can be written as




where cSA (U) = u¡1 ((1 ¡ ¯)U) is the constant beneﬁt paid to workers in SA by the planner.
4.3 Human Capital Dynamics Are Necessary for Policy Transitions
In order to study the characteristics of the optimal program in absence of human capital dynamics, we consider
the case where human capital is not a state variable (i.e., it remains always constant), thus ¼ (¢) and ! (¢) do
which implies that the cost is CUI(U) = ¼c
s + (1 ¡ ¼)c
f = ¼g(U +
e
¼) + (1 ¡ ¼)g(U):
















which is positive for any U if and only if g
0 is convex (because ¼(U +
e
¼)+(1¡¼)U = U +e). Thus, under this condition,
the cost of satisfying the IC constraint [CUI(U) ¡ CJM(U)] is increasing in U:
14not depend on h but ¼;! > 0: For example, this case occurs when ± = A = 0: The planner’s values of each
policy are deﬁned as in Section 3.2, without dependence on h: Since there is no human capital variation, there
is no role for training policies.
In the next proposition, we show that the structure of an optimal WTW program in an economy without
human capital depreciation is very sharp: each policy is absorbing.
Proposition 2 (No human capital dynamics): If ¼ (¢) and ! (¢) do not depend on h; every policy (JM,
SA, UI) is absorbing: if policy i is chosen at the beginning of the program, choosing it thereafter is optimal. If,
in addition, V is strictly concave, any optimal program must possess such absorbing characteristics.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Consider the problem of a planner facing an agent with initial utility entitlement equal to a level U0 where
only one policy between UI;JM and SA is implemented with certainty.14 For U0 high enough, the search eﬀort
compensation cost is prohibitive and the planner will release the agent immediately into social assistance, which
is absorbing.
Suppose now that U0 is such that the planner decides to require the agent to supply positive search eﬀort: the
choice would be between either facing the IC constraint or paying ·JM to monitor the agent’s eﬀort perfectly.
As the utility entitlement falls, the IC constraint becomes “cheaper” to satisfy, so for low enough initial levels
of U0; the planner will begin by enrolling the agent in UI; while for intermediate values of U0 the planner will
choose JM as its initial policy. During UI; because of incentive compatibility, the state variable U is decreasing
which reinforces the optimality of UI compared to the other available policies, since a smaller U reduces the
incentive costs. During JM the agent is fully insured: since V is concave, keeping the promised utility constant
over time and never switching out of JM is always an optimal policy.
The same logic used in Proposition 2 can be used to rank the slopes of the value function with respect to
U; a result that will be extended in the next section.
Corollary to Proposition 2: The (negative) slopes of the value functions with respect to U satisfy
ˆ V SA
U (U) ¸ V JM
U (U) ¸ V UI
U (U);
where the ﬁrst inequality holds for any U, whereas the second inequality holds at the crossing point, i.e., at the
unique (if any) U where V JM (U) = V UI (U).
Proof: See Appendix B.
14In general at U0 the optimal program might involve random assignment to diﬀerent policies in period zero. The
proof of Proposition 2 establishes that, in a stationary economy, period zero is the only period in which such random
assignment might occur.
15The value of unemployment insurance for the planner V UI falls more steeply than JM with respect to U
because of the incentive cost, and V JM is steeper than ˆ V SA because of the eﬀort-compensation cost. These
properties imply that the relevant value functions, if they cross, can cross at most once.
4.4 The Optimal WTW Program without Training
In this section we begin the characterization of the optimal WTW scheme in the presence of human capital
dynamics. It is useful to start by abstracting from the training option and postpone its introduction to Section
4.5. Our ultimate aim is to answer questions such as: What is the optimal sequence of policies? What are the
dynamics of unemployment beneﬁts and taxes/subsidies upon re-employment, within each policy?
The recursive formulation naturally suggests the following two-step strategy to approach these questions.
We will ﬁrst derive a simple graphical representation of the regions within the (U;h) state space where each
policy arises as optimal, a result of its own independent interest. Next, by reading the (U;h) state space as a
phase diagram–whose dynamics are driven by the policy functions Uy (U;h) describing the law of motion for
the endogenous variable U, and by the exogenous laws of motion for human capital (1) and (2)–we will be able
to recover the sequence of policies within the optimal WTW program.
Finally, the policy functions ci (U;h) and ce (U), together with the laws of motion for the two states, fully
describe the optimal sequence of unemployment beneﬁts, as well as wage taxes/subsidies during the optimal
WTW program, since ¿ (U;h) = ! (h) ¡ ce (U):
4.4.1 Representation in the (U,h) Space
In the Corollary to Proposition 2, we have established the relative slopes of the value functions with respect to
U in the stationary case. The next proposition establishes conditions under which the result remains true for
the general case with human capital dynamics.
Proposition 3 (Slopes of the value functions with respect to U): Let ´ (U;h) be the real number
that solves
VU (U;h) = ¡g0 ((1 ¡ ¯)(U + ´ (U;h)));
where g ´ u¡1 is the inverse utility function. Assume that ´ (U;h) is non-increasing in U for every h: Then,
the (negative) slopes of the value functions V i with respect to U satisfy
V UI
U (U;h) · V JM
U (U;h) · ˆ V SA
U (U) = ¡g0 ((1 ¡ ¯)U) for all pairs (U;h):
Proof: See Appendix B.
Given the convexity of g0, the required condition essentially establishes an upper bound on the curvature of
V. For example, in the stationary case with log utility, if the implemented policy is SA then ´(U) = 0, if it is
16JM then ´(U) = e=(1 ¡ ¯), and if it is UI then we can establish that ´(U) = ¯ ´ > e=(1 ¡ ¯) (Pavoni, 2003a).
From the deﬁnition of V, it is therefore easy to see that, in this case, the condition of Proposition 3 is satisﬁed.
In the next proposition we establish an intuitive ranking on the slope of the value functions V i across the
diﬀerent policies i = JM;SA;UI, with respect to human capital h; under a somehow less restrictive assumption.
Proposition 4 (Slopes of the value functions with respect to h): Assume that the value function
V is sub-modular and that both V and V i are diﬀerentiable in h: Then, their slopes with respect to h satisfy
V UI
h (U;h) ¸ V JM
h (U;h) ¸ ˆ V SA
h (U) = 0 for all U;h:
Proof: See Appendix B.
The logic of this proposition is that V UI is steeper than V JM because of the incentive cost and V JM is
steeper than ˆ V SA (invariant to h) because of the returns to search.
To understand the role of submodularity, recall that in the twice-diﬀerentiable case submodularity means
VU;h (U;h) · 0: The shape of V is generated by two contrasting forces. First, “within-policy” there is a
tendency toward supermodularity: an increase in h raises ¼ (h) and reduces the marginal cost of delivering a
given level of utility U since incentives are more easily provided. However, a high h makes it more attractive to
implement active policies like JM or UI, and we saw that search-intensive policies have more negative slopes
with respect to U. This “between-policy” force that tends to generate submodularity of V hinges on the fact
that the expected ﬂow return ¼ (h)! (h) is an increasing function of h. The assumption in Proposition 4 holds
whenever the second force dominates the ﬁrst, for example, when ¼ (¢) is constant and the wage increases with
skills, a case that will be analyzed in Proposition 6.15
Given our characterization of the relative slopes of V i with respect to U and h, when the upper envelope
V (U;h) = maxi V i (U;h) is projected onto the (U;h) space, as done in Figure 1, we obtain immediately the
regions in the state space where each policy emerges as optimal. Note that these are well deﬁned and connected
regions. We start by interpreting Figure 1 as we move “horizontally” in the (U;h) space, i.e., we let U change
for a given h: Next, we study the optimal policies as we move “vertically” through the diagram, i.e., we change
h for a given level of utility entitlement U:
Moving horizontally (along U): Given any h; start from the highest utility level in the diagram. For
high enough U; compensating the agent for the high eﬀort is prohibitively costly, and SA is optimal. Moving
leftward, as we decrease U the eﬀort compensation cost falls and it becomes optimal to choose a program
with high-eﬀort requirement. For intermediate levels of U, the incentive cost is still high and the value of JM
15General conditions on the primitives for V to be submodular are hard to establish. One technical reason is that the
nature of the max operator is to preserve supermodularity, but not necessarily submodularity (e.g., see Hopenhayn and
Prescott, 1992).
17dominates the value of UI. As we keep decreasing U; gradually the planner ﬁnds it more proﬁtable to face the
incentive cost rather than pay the ﬁxed monitoring cost ·JM, and UI becomes optimal.
Moving vertically (along h): Given any U; for high levels of h (i.e., high ! (h) and ¼ (h)), returns from
search are high and incentive costs are low, so UI is optimal. Moving downward, as h falls incentive costs
increase and the planner ﬁnds it optimal to pay the monitoring cost and implement JM. For very low levels of
h; the returns to search are so low that the planner prefers to save the eﬀort-compensation costs as well, and
SA is the optimal program.
4.4.2 Optimal Sequence of Policies
The optimal sequence of policies is dictated by the evolution of the state vector (U;h). Conditional on unem-
ployment, h declines monotonically, that is, whenever search is unsuccessful we have hf · h. The evolution of
U depends on the speciﬁc policy. Formally, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 5 (Optimal Policy Sequence): Assume that V satisﬁes all properties required in Proposi-
tions 3 and 4, and recall that V is a concave function. If V is either strictly concave or strictly submodular or
both, then, if at some period t the optimal program selects JM; then next period it is always optimal to either
repeat JM or switch to SA. In particular, an optimal WTW program never switches from JM into UI.
Proof: See Appendix B.
It is straightforward to show two properties of the dynamics of U. First, because of its absorbing nature and
full insurance, during SA the continuation utility U is constant. Second, during UI, the utility entitlement Uf
promised by the planner to the unemployed worker when search fails tends to decline monotonically to satisfy
the incentive constraint.
Third, perhaps surprisingly, during JM the utility entitlement of the agent will increase (see Lemma A7
in Appendix B). There is a simple, almost mechanical, explanation for this behavior. As h decreases along the
unemployment spell, the optimal program approaches the social assistance option. Because of full insurance,
the beneﬁts c are constant between JM and SA, but once in social assistance, the agent will also save the
search-eﬀort cost e. Hence, the overall utility is higher in SA; and Uf gradually increases during JM as the
implementation of SA becomes more and more likely in the program.
Combining the dynamics of h and U with our graphical representation, we immediately obtain another key
qualitative characteristic of an optimal WTW program: as soon as the program enters into the JM region, it
can either remain in JM or switch to SA: In particular, a transition from JM to UI is never optimal because
both human capital depreciation and the rise in promised utility during JM worsen the incentive cost and make
UI less attractive over time.
18Conditional on failure of search, the typical sequence of an optimal WTW program without training hence
begins with UI followed by JM followed, in turn, by SA: Figure 1 illustrates a simulated individual history
of an unemployed worker leading to this optimal sequence of policies.16 Interestingly, this is also the typical
observed sequence of actual programs in many countries: in general, the implementation of active policies starts
after a spell of unemployment insurance.
Of course, with the same parameterization, for higher levels of initial promised utility U0 (and/or lower
levels of h0) the optimal program will start in JM and skip UI altogether, and for even higher levels of U0
(and/or even lower levels of h0) it may start and end with SA. In contrast, for parameterizations where the
monitoring cost ·JM is especially high, JM may not arise as optimal at all and UI will be directly followed by
SA:
Part of our characterization of the state space and the optimal sequence of policies relies on restrictions on
V, which are endogenous.17 Given the discussion following Proposition 4 on the submodularity of V; it should
be clear that one important special case of the model where such property is satisﬁed is an economy where the
agent is subject only to wage depreciation during unemployment, while the hazard rate function ¼ (¢) is ﬁxed at
some constant ¼ > 0: This important special case is also much easier to handle analytically, and we are able to
provide a full characterization of the policy sequence by only imposing conditions on primitives of the model.
Proposition 6 (No duration dependence): Assume that the hazard rate does not change with h and
that it is ﬁxed at ¼ > 0: Then, if at some period t the optimal program selects JM; next period it is always
optimal to either repeat JM or switch to SA. In particular, an optimal WTW program never switches from
JM into UI.
Proof: See Appendix B.
It may appear surprising, at ﬁrst, that even though the hazard rate is constant, JM should follow UI since
we argued that the rise in incentive costs as h depreciates is associated to the fall in ¼ (h) and the corresponding
widening of the utility spread in (IC1). There is, however, an additional reason why incentive costs go up as
h depreciates that survives as long as ! (¢) is increasing in h. In a multiperiod setting, the optimal incentive
provision is shaped by the tension between intra- and inter-period consumption smoothing. The planner can
improve intra-period consumption insurance (across employment states) by moving part of the punishment
burden forward into the future. The emergence of SA, where Uf cannot decline further, limits the use of the
inter-period margin, forcing the UI payments to be biased toward the static component of the incentives. This
eﬀective shortening of the time horizon during UI makes the incentive cost higher for the planner, the lower is
h.
16The parameterization of this example is exactly as in Section 6.1.
17It might be worthwhile mentioning that our numerical simulations have widely veriﬁed that the slopes of the value
functions are those guaranteed by our assumptions on V.
194.4.3 Optimal Beneﬁts and Wage Taxes/Subsidies
We now turn to the qualitative characterization of the optimal sequence of the unemployment beneﬁts and wage
taxes/subsidies. We have the following result:
Proposition 7 (Payments): (i) During unemployment insurance (UI), beneﬁts are decreasing; (ii) during
job search monitoring (JM), the beneﬁts are constant and the wage tax (subsidy) is decreasing (increasing); (iii)
during social assistance (SA) beneﬁts are constant; (iv) if ¼ and ! do not depend on h (ﬁxed human capital
case), during UI the wage tax is increasing over time, and during JM both the beneﬁts and the wage tax/subsidy
are constant.
Proof: See Appendix B.
The need for incentive provision under UI implies that payments should decrease with unemployment
duration. Beneﬁts are constant in SA and JM because, within these policies, the absence of incentive problems
allows the planner to implement full insurance.
The result on the structure of payments and taxes during UI in the model without human capital dynamics
is a re-statement of Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) specialized to our environment. A direct consequence of (iv)
is that wage subsidies are either paid at the beginning of the unemployment spell (for particular combinations
of high U0 and low h0), or otherwise they will never be used: the government will never switch from a wage tax
to a wage subsidy during the program. The presence of human capital depreciation changes predictions in two
dimensions. First, the behavior of the wage tax during UI becomes a quantitative issue, which will be discussed
below. Second, since the expected gross wage ! (h) decreases during unemployment and ce is constant during
JM, the wage tax ¿ (U;h) = ! (h) ¡ ce (U;h) must now decrease and could become a subsidy.
In order to graphically illustrate the key features of the beneﬁts paid across the various policies, it is useful
to simulate the model. The bottom right panel of Figure 2 shows the path of wage depreciation. In particular,
given the complexity of the algorithm, to reduce the grid points for h, we allow depreciation to be stochastic in
the numerical simulations: upon realization of the outcome y = f, human capital either remains constant or falls
by one grid point (the h grid is spaced geometrically). The top left panel shows the behavior of the UI beneﬁts
as a fraction of the initial wage, and the net wage (wage minus tax, or plus subsidy) that the unemployed worker
would earn if she found a job in that period. The top right panel depicts the implied tax/subsidy, as a fraction
of the current wage; the bottom left panel shows the dynamics of Uf which are exactly those depicted on the
state space in Figure 1.
As previously discussed, beneﬁts (consumption during unemployment) decrease during UI and remain
constant throughout JM and SA because of consumption smoothing. The net wage (consumption during
employment) ﬁrst decreases and then tends to rise as UI approaches JM: There are two main reasons for these
20dynamics. First, as human capital depreciates, expected utility dispersion must rise to satisfy the IC constraint
(IC1) and part of this additional dispersion is generated in terms of a wider gap in current consumption across
employment states. Second, as explained above, when h depreciates, the eﬀective time horizon of the UI
problem shortens and the planner must give incentives creating a wider spread between consumption across
states. As a result, the planner starts using heavily wage subsidies in order to reward employment and to widen
the diﬀerence between UI payments and net wage upon job ﬁnding.18
When the worker enters JM; there is complete insurance also across employment and unemployment states,
hence the net wage and unemployment beneﬁts coincide and remain constant. Here, the behavior of the wage
subsidy essentially mirrors that of the re-employment wage (and of human capital): a simple inspection of the
bottom right and the top right panels shows that, indeed, once entered into JM the wage subsidy increases if
and only if human capital depreciates in order to keep consumption across states perfectly smooth. Thus, in
the deterministic depreciation case, the subsidy rises monotonically.
4.5 The Optimal WTW Program with Training
We now allow the planner to access the training technology detailed in equations (9) and begin by discussing
the typical region of the state space where training is the preferred policy instrument for the planner.
Formal training tends to emerge as optimal in the state space for low values of promised utility and for
intermediate values of human capital. Since the training technology requires a positive input of eﬀort and
features an incentive constraint, we should expect either social assistance or job-search monitoring (or, possibly,
both) to dominate training for high enough values of U when compensating the training eﬀort and satisfying
the IC constraint is too costly for the planner. The existence of a ﬁxed cost ·TR explains why TR is too costly
for low levels of human capital. Moreover, the fact that both ¼ (¢) and ! (¢) are bounded above implies that at
high levels of h the returns to training are too low to justify the training expenditure, so TR will not be chosen
for high enough values of human capital.
In Figure 3, we display two possible conﬁgurations of the training region. In the upper panel, we parame-
terized the training technology with a high ﬁxed cost ·TR, but also high returns; the training technology in the
lower panel has instead low ﬁxed cost and sharp decreasing returns, so the region where TR is optimal shifts
down in the space.19
It is evident that the model does not put tight restrictions on the position of the training phase in the
optimal policy sequence. The two paths for (U;h) plotted in the ﬁgure illustrate that in the case of the upper
18An advantage of allowing for stochastic depreciation in the numerical simulations is that we can choose a history of
human capital where, for several periods (1 to 11), h is constant, as assumed by Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997), in order
to illustrate that the features of the optimal contract they emphasize arise as a particular case of our setup: beneﬁts,
net wage, and U
f
t never stop decreasing (and taxes never stop increasing) over this sub-period.
19For the upper panel, we have set ·
TR = $140 and the return to training to 9:2%; for the lower panel, ·
TR = 0 and
the return to training is 8:1%. In the data, we estimate the cost of training ·
TR = $162 and its return to be 7%: See
Section 6.1 for details.
21panel, the typical sequence starts with UI, followed by TR and then by UI again; in the lower panel, TR can be
followed by JM.20 We conclude that only a quantitative analysis, case by case, can shed light on the optimal
policy sequence of a WTW program with training.
The histories of promised utility and human capital plotted in the two panels of Figure 3 highlight an
interesting property of the optimal WTW program: after a successful spell of training, U can rise in order to
satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint, i.e., Us > U. This increase in continuation utility is accompanied
by human capital accumulation and the agent moves “north east” in the phase diagram, a result that has its
counterpart in the dynamics of unemployment beneﬁts, as stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 8 (Payment under TR): Whenever the incentive compatibility constraint binds, beneﬁts
decrease when training fails and increase after a successful spell of training. When it does not bind, beneﬁts are
constant regardless of the training outcome.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Therefore, during an optimal WTW program, beneﬁts should genuinely rise if the veriﬁable outcome of TR
is positive as a reward for the worker’s eﬀort.
In Figure 4, we report the path of unemployment beneﬁts and earnings subsidies upon re-employment for
the same parametrization and the same history plotted in the lower panel of Figure 3. As for depreciation,
we allow accumulation to be stochastic in these numerical simulations: upon realization of the outcome y = s,
human capital either remains constant or rises by one grid point. The Figure shows that when TR fails, in the
ﬁrst 4 periods of the training program, beneﬁts decline, whereas when TR is successful, in the next 10 periods,
beneﬁts increase rather steeply.
As for the tax/subsidy, when skills are rebuilt through successful training both the re-employment wage and
the continuation utility Us promised by the WTW program tend to increase. The ﬁrst force makes a tax upon
re-employment more likely, while the second makes it less likely. More generally, the less eﬀective the formal
training technology is (e.g., small success probability µ and/or negligible human capital gain from training),
the more likely the optimal wage tax (subsidy) is to decrease (rise) after a spell of successful training. For a
given gain in the gross wage ! (h), a small value of µ will be associated with a higher value of Us and hence
a higher promised consumption level upon re-employment. For given Us, a small increase in human capital
during training is associated to a low rise in ! (h), thus a larger subsidy is necessary to deliver the promised
consumption level.
In our particular parameterization, after a successful spell of TR, human capital can either rise or remain
constant. From Figure 4, one can see that when h increases the re-employment tax rises, while when h is constant
20Interestingly, one can also generate histories where JM is chosen optimally both before and after TR, as in the
mandatory sequence of the U.K. “New Deal” program discussed in the Introduction.
22the tax falls, consistently with the discussion above on the forces shaping the optimal wage tax/subsidy during
training.
5 A Simple Implementation with Access to Credit Markets
Throughout our analysis we have assumed that the agent cannot self-insure. In this section, we relax this
assumption and allow the agent to save through credit markets at rate R = ¯
¡1, but we maintain that she faces
a no-borrowing constraint and starts without liquid assets. These two assumptions are not unreasonable for
low-income workers on the welfare rolls. For example, Gruber (2001) documents that the median net ﬁnancial
wealth of the unemployed in the U.S. is zero. Crossley and Low (2005) arrive at the same ﬁnding for Canada
where, in addition, 30% of the unemployed workers self-report to be unable to borrow.
Under these conditions, we demonstrate that with the help of an additional ﬁscal instrument, a linear
interest rate tax, the planner can induce the agent not to save (by keeping her at the borrowing constraint)
and, as a result, is able to fully control her consumption through the payments speciﬁed by the contract.
First of all, note that during JM or SA the optimal contract smooths the agent’s consumption perfectly.
It is easy to demonstrate that during a period of UI, for any level of human capital h, the payments of the
















where the superscripts s and f denote “success” and “failure” of search. During TR, this equation holds with
µ in place of ¼ (h). From (12) and Jensen’s inequality,











with strict inequality each time cs
t+1 > c
f
t+1 (a typical situation under UI or TR where the allocations must
be incentive compatible and the planner cannot oﬀer full insurance). This inequality shows that the optimal
payment scheme always forces the agent to under-consume next period, compared to its individual optimum:
the agent would then choose to save at time t in order to increase consumption next period and equate current
and expected marginal utility of consumption (Rogerson, 1985).
Therefore, the sole imposition of a borrowing constraint does not rule out a situation where individual
consumption would diverge from the beneﬁts paid by the planner–a failure of the optimal contract: the planner
must prevent the agent from saving.
A simple linear tax ¿k on interests that restores equality in (13) is not enough to guarantee that the agent
would not be willing to save. Indeed, the most proﬁtable deviation for the agent is joint: the agent would reduce




23reduction in eﬀort makes the consumption distribution shift toward the worst outcome, which in turn generates
an additional incentive to save at t to ﬁnance consumption at time t + 1.
Consider instead a linear tax ¿k





























The expression above demonstrates that an agent facing such tax is never willing to save, neither considering
the joint deviation “save and shirk”(and the above Euler equation holds with equality), nor in equilibrium, i.e.
when she follows the eﬀort recommendations of the contract (and the above Euler equation holds with the strict
inequality). The agent would always be willing to borrow, but because of the liquidity constraint, the planner
maintains full control on her consumption stream and the optimal WTW contract characterized in the previous
sections can still be implemented. In particular, it is easy to see that when utility is logarithmic in consumption,










In other words, the tax is proportional to the steepest slope of the unemployment beneﬁts path along the
optimal WTW program.
This scheme can also be adapted to situations where the initial (but observable) wealth is positive as long
as it is not “too high”. In these cases, the agent must be forced immediately toward the borrowing limit with
an appropriately chosen initial transfer. Assuming that unemployment beneﬁts cannot be negative, it is easy
to show that the optimal WTW program can still be implemented for initial wealth levels up to the payment
speciﬁed by the optimal WTW program at time t = 0. In extreme cases, the optimal WTW program would
require a waiting period without payment of beneﬁts.21
Finally, note that this implementation mechanism is totally anonymous, since it does not require the planner
to observe individual saving decisions, but it only demands control over the aggregate volume of savings.22 We
acknowledge that this implementation of the optimal contract where the agent’s consumption is fully controlled
by the government may not be too appealing for the design of an optimal taxation scheme in the aggregate
economy (as in Golosov and Tsyvinski, 2003; Albanesi and Sleet, 2005; Kocherlakota, 2005). However, we think
it has the advantage of being much simpler than those proposed in the existing literature and it ﬁts well the
case of low-income, low-wealth workers on the welfare rolls, which are the target of our study.
21Interestingly, in several states (e.g., Texas and California) UI beneﬁts start to be paid one week after reporting
the unemployment status. This rule corresponds exactly to a zero initial transfer to induce the agent to dissave. Our
result echoes the ﬁnding by Wang and Williamson (2002) who conclude that when unemployed agents have enough
self-insurance savings available, in the initial phase of the optimal contract beneﬁts could be back-loaded.
22This requirement can be guaranteed, for example, by the presence of ﬁnancial intermediaries which are allowed to
maintain secrecy on the identities of the speciﬁc depositors, but whose aggregate volume of transactions is monitored
for taxation proposes, and are required by the government to act as withholding agents, i.e., they deduct a withholding
tax from all interest payments, and transfer the total revenues to the government. These institutional characteristics are
actually present in some countries such as Italy and Sweden, for example.
246 Quantitative Analysis: Assessing the Optimality of Some U.S.
Welfare Programs
In this section, we illustrate how our framework can be used for quantitative work. The ﬁrst step is the
calibration of the model to match some salient features of the U.S. labor market and of the current U.S. welfare
system. We can then simulate histories of unemployed workers with diﬀerent initial skill levels h0 undergoing the
existing welfare program and calculate the expected initial utility entitlement ¯ U0 (h0) promised by the current
system. Next, we solve for the optimal WTW program that delivers the same expected utility and contrast
its features, in terms of optimal sequence of policies, time-path of beneﬁts and structure of taxes/subsidies, to
the current program. We then calculate the budget savings for the government associated to switching to the
optimal WTW scheme.
6.1 Calibration
It is useful to divide the parameters of the model into four groups: ﬁrst, the preference parameters fu(¢);¯;eg;





fourth, the set of parameters characterizing the current U.S. welfare system





for each policy phase, observed payments
¡
¯ ci¢
, and the observed tax/subsidies (¯ ¿)
in the actual U.S. scheme as a function of earnings.
The unit of time for our calibration is one month. We focus on the period 1991-1999, since the main source of
our data on welfare-to-work policies refers to that period (see below). Next, we outline our calibration strategy,
and in Table 1 we list the calibrated parameter values.
6.1.1 Demographics and Preferences
Household and period of reference: The typical individual on the welfare rolls is a 30-year-old single parent
with two children. Roughly half of them hold a high-school diploma, and the other half are high-school dropouts
(Moﬃtt, 2003). This is our household of reference in the exercise.
Preferences: We pick a value for the monthly discount factor ¯ = :9957 in order to match an interest
rate of 5% on a yearly basis, and use a logarithmic speciﬁcation for the period-utility over consumption. We
assume that the disutility of work eﬀort equals the disutility of search/training eﬀort e. To set a value for e, we
follow a common practice in calibrated macroeconomic models. Suppose that the disutility of the fraction of
time n spent working/searching/training is also logarithmic, and let Á be the preference parameter measuring
the relative weight on leisure versus consumption. From the static optimality condition of the agent and the
observation that the labor share is 0:60, the consumption-income ratio is 0:75 and the fraction of time worked is
25n = 0:3, one obtains Á = 1:78 (Cooley, 1995). Then, the disutility of eﬀort is e = Á[ln(1) ¡ ln(1 ¡ n)] = 0:63.
This eﬀort cost corresponds to roughly 1/4 of the utility associated to consuming a monthly wage of $1;500.
6.1.2 Labor Market Parameters
Wage function: We assume a linear (monthly) wage function ! (h) = h; where human capital h is interpreted
as eﬃciency units of labor in a competitive labor market. Thus, changes in human capital map directly into
observable wage changes. We normalize h so that one unit corresponds to $100, e.g., h = 15 means a monthly
wage of $1;500:
Wage depreciation: The existing microeconomic estimates of wage depreciation span a wide range. At
the high end, Keane and Wolpin (1997) within a structural model estimate an average annual skill depreciation
rate of 23% (36% for white collars and 9:6% for blue collars). At the other end, the average annual earnings
loss upon displacement computed by Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan (1993, Table 3) is roughly 10%. In the
middle of the spectrum, Neal (1995, Table 3) reports that an additional week of unemployment reduces the
re-employment wage by 0:37%, implying an annual decay rate of 17:5%: Addison and Portugal (1989) ﬁnd that
a rise in duration by 10% reduces post-displacement wages by 1%. Since the average duration of unemployment
corresponds to 8:5 months in their sample, they implicitly estimate a yearly skill depreciation rate of 16%:
Overall, choosing a value of 15% per year seems appropriate.
The numerical load required to solve for the optimal dynamic contract in our setup is quite heavy. Thus, to
reduce the number of grid points for human capital, it is useful to allow depreciation to be stochastic: workers
either keep their human capital level with probability qf, or move down one step on the human capital grid,
with probability 1 ¡ qf: In order to have a constant expected depreciation rate for all levels of human capital,
we set a geometrically spaced grid.23
Hazard function: To estimate the hazard function, we exploit information on the length of the current
unemployment spell for workers who report to be unemployed in the Basic Monthly Current Population Survey
(CPS). Within the window 1991-1999, the year from May 1995 to April 1996 witnessed a very stable unem-
ployment rate, always between 5.5% and 5.7%. We choose these 12 months for our estimation in order to avoid
issues of non-stationarity in the parameters. We restrict our sample to workers with at most a high-school
degree, between 18 and 50 years old. Our estimation strategy follows closely the method outlined by Flinn
(1986) and assumes a Weibull distribution with hazard function
p(t) = ®¸t¸¡1;
where t is the length of the unemployment spell.
23If the grid is geometrically spaced at rate ∆, and x
f is the estimated monthly depreciation rate of human capital,
q
f solves q
f = 1 ¡ x
f=∆:
26The estimated hazard displays negative duration dependence
³
ˆ ¸ = 0:66
´
, even after controlling for unob-
served heterogeneity. The top panel of Figure 5 shows that the bulk of the drop in the job ﬁnding probability
occurs in the ﬁrst 12 months, after which the hazard keeps decaying more slowly. This qualitative feature is in
line with the existing empirical evidence.24 The bottom panel maps the hazard p(t), as a function of duration,
into a function of human capital ¼ (h), based on a depreciation rate of 15% per year and an initial earnings
level of $1;500 (h0 = 15), the average of our CPS sample. See Appendix C for more details on the estimation
procedure.
6.1.3 Parameters of JM and TR Technologies
The U.S. Department of Education and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services jointly spon-
sored a large-scale evaluation of welfare-to-work policies, the National Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work Strategies
(NEWWS), based on data pertaining to over 40,000 individuals followed for 5 years, (falling between 1991 and
1999, depending on the location), in 11 diﬀerent locations. This study uses a rigorous research design based on
random assignment of individuals to a treatment group and a control group, in each program.25 This ensures
that there are no systematic diﬀerences between background characteristics of people in the diﬀerent groups.
In particular, three locations, Atlanta (GA), Grand Rapids (MI), and Riverside (CA) simultaneously oper-
ated, expressly for the evaluation, two diﬀerent mandatory programs, a “labor force attachment” (LFA) program
focused on job-search monitoring and a “human capital development” (HCD) program focused on training. In
what follows, we only use data referring to these three locations for our calibration. Of the several adult train-
ing programs implemented (basic education, vocational training, post-secondary education, transitional jobs),
due to data constraints we can only focus on “adult basic education” courses targeted to the achievement of a
high-school diploma or an equivalent degree (GED).26
Costs: NEWWS (2001, Tables 13.2 and 13.3) documents in detail the operational costs of running each
speciﬁc activity. An average across the three locations for the LFA programs reveals that the job-search
monitoring cost is roughly $478 per month/per worker, and a similar average for the HCD programs shows that
formal training costs $162 per month/per worker. These two numbers map exactly into our parameters ·JM
and ·TR, respectively.
Success rate of training: NEWWS (2002, Figure 3.3) reports that, on average, 20% of workers enrolled in
24For example, van den Berg and van Ours (1996) conclude that, in the U.S., the exit probability from unemployment
falls by 30% after 3 months of unemployment. Blank (1989) ﬁnds that the bulk of the decline in the welfare hazard occurs
before two years. For the U.K., Nickell (1979) ﬁnds a 50% decrease in the hazard rate after 15 months of unemployment,
and van den Berg and van Ours (1994) report a decrease by over 30% after 6 months of unemployment.
25The control group was completely excluded from any program for at least 3 years. After 3 years, only 6% of the
control group received some treatment.
26Data on the operational costs of each program are available by type of training, but detailed information on the
success rate of training and, conditional on success, on its earnings and employment impact are only available for basic
adult education.
27adult education receive a high-school diploma or GED at the end of every month of enrollment, i.e., the average
duration of training is roughly 5 months. It is natural to consider the achievement of these credentials as the
successful outcome, hence we base our value for the success rate of training µ on this number. Interestingly, the
success rate appears ﬂat for a wide range of durations (2-18 months), exactly as in our speciﬁcation, where it
follows a stationary Poisson process.
Return to training: Among participants to basic training classes within HCD programs across our three
locations, NEWWS (2002, Table 4.7) estimates that those who received a diploma earned 17% more than those
who didn’t per each quarter worked, three years after the treatment.27 This value for the return of adult
education is on the high end of the range of existing estimates. LaLonde (1995), and Heckman, LaLonde and
Smith (1999) indicate that the typical return to public training is far below 10%.
This return to basic adult training contains both a pure wage gain and an impact on re-employment
probabilities during the quarter. We need to isolate the ﬁrst component to properly calibrate A. To this end,
we use the fact that the NEWWS data also report the eﬀect on annual earnings, besides quarterly earnings, and
ﬁnd it to be 46%: Comparing the quarterly and annual returns, we conclude that roughly 60% of the return is in
terms of employment and 40% in terms of wages. This ﬁnding is in line with the existing literature: Jacobson,
LaLonde and Sullivan (2003), in a study on the impact of classroom training on displaced worker, ﬁnd that
between 1/2 and 2/3 of the total earnings increase is associated with higher likelihood of becoming employed. In
light of this evidence, we set A to generate a permanent rise of 7% in monthly wages for workers going through
successful training compared to the “untreated”.
It remains to verify how a 7% change in h aﬀects the re-employment probability in the model, given
our estimated hazard ¼ (h). To replicate the total earnings gain of 17%, the hazard rate should increase by
approximately 10%: The eﬀect on the hazard rate is nonlinear, given the shape of the Weibull, but it is simple
to compute that based on our estimate, on average, augmenting h by 7% moves up the hazard by 11%: Finally,
given the inability to identify the curvature of the training technology from the available data, we assume a
linear technology with ® = 1.28
6.1.4 Parameters of the Existing U.S. Welfare System
Several pieces of legislation over the years have built a network of federal and state government interventions in
the U.S. labor market. Since in Appendix D, we list in detail the major components of the U.S. welfare system,
here we keep the exposition to a minimum.
27To partially control for selection, we have used the estimate of the marginal eﬀect of receiving a diploma conditional
on the score of a literacy test (TALS) administered upon entering the program.
28To parsimoniously parameterize the stochastic training, we replicate what we do for the depreciation technology. We
assume that workers can either keep their human capital level with probability q
s, or move up one step on the geometric
human capital grid, with probability 1 ¡ q
s:
28Policy durations: As they become unemployed, for the ﬁrst 6 months workers are entitled to unemploy-
ment insurance. At the expiration of the UI phase, workers enter the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF) regime and are subject to mandatory active labor market programs. Based on the strictest time limits
rules for TANF discussed in Appendix D, we assume that this regime lasts for 24 months. Broadly speaking,
there exist two types of mandatory programs: Human Capital Development (HCD) programs where the em-
phasis is on training, and Labor Force Attachment (LFA) programs, where the focus is on job-search assistance
and monitoring. Given the available information on the length of training and job monitoring, we model the
HCD programs as a maximum of 18 months of training followed by a maximum of 6 months of assisted job
search, and the LFA programs as a maximum of 18 months of monitored job search followed by a maximum of
6 months of basic education. We use these observed durations to calibrate
©¯ dUI; ¯ dJM; ¯ dTRª
.
Beneﬁts: During UI, workers are entitled to beneﬁts comprising a replacement of 60% on their past
earnings, plus food stamps. On a monthly basis, for a family of three, the maximum allotment of food stamps
(averaged across Atlanta, Grand Rapids and Riverside) was $290 in the period under consideration (NEWWS
2001, Table 2.1). We also calculate that a typical household of three enrolled in the mandatory programs in
any of these locations received average welfare payments (TANF beneﬁts plus food stamps) of $740 per month
independently of the search/training activity (NEWWS 2001, Table 2.1). When the TANF time limits are
reached, we assume that workers receive only food stamps as social assistance. These values allow to calibrate
©
¯ cUI;¯ cJM;¯ cTRª
.
Taxes/Subsidies: In the event individuals ﬁnd employment, they are subject to an unemployment tax
(FUTA and state tax) at the ﬂat rate of 0:8%. Workers’ earnings are subsidized exactly as indicated by the
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) legislation for a family of three in the period
Table 1: Summary of the Parameterization
Parameter Value Moment to Match
¯ 0:9957 Interest rate (Cooley, 1995)
e 0:630 Fraction of time spent working (Cooley, 1995)
± 0:0135 Monthly human capital depreciation (various sources)
¼ (h) see text Unemployment hazard function (Basic CPS 1995-1996)
·JM $478 Monthly cost of JSM (NEWWS, 2001)
·TR $162 Monthly cost of TR (NEWWS, 2001)
µ 0:20 Fraction of workers in TR receiving degree (NEWWS, 2001)
A 1:07 Wage gain upon successful TR (NEWWS, 2002)
¯ cUI 0:60 ¢ ! UI Beneﬁts (U.S. Department of Labor)
¯ cJM;¯ cTR $740 TANF Beneﬁts (NEWWS, 2001)
¯ cSA $290 Max allotment of Food Stamps (NEWWS, 2001)
¯ dUI 6 Duration of UI in months (U.S. Department of Labor)
¯ dJM LFA = 18;HCD = 6 Duration of JSM in months (NEWWS, 2001)
¯ dTR LFA = 6;HCD = 18 Duration of TR in months (NEWWS, 2001)
¿ (h) see text FUTA and EITC (Hotz and Scholtz, 2001)
29under consideration–see Appendix D for details. These two institutions determine jointly the function ¯ ¿ (h).
Two key inputs of the normative analysis are the initial utility entitlement promised implicitly by the actual
U.S. welfare program ¯ U0 (h0), and the associated stream of public expenditures ¯ V (h0). In computing these
values, we follow closely the strategy suggested by Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997). Since both employment
and social assistance are absorbing states, by backward induction it is easy to reconstruct the initial expected
utility entitlement a worker with initial human capital h0 would receive under the current U.S. welfare system
and the net government expenditures associated to this level of utility.29 For example, the expenditures include
the beneﬁts and wage subsidies paid to the worker (during unemployment and employment, respectively), and
the costs of operating training and job search monitoring programs for the durations speciﬁed above, net of the
tax levied on earnings.
6.2 Results
We begin by studying the optimal sequence of policies and payments for two types of workers, a high-skilled
worker with pre-displacement monthly wage of $1;500 (h0 = 15) and a low-skilled worker with monthly wage
of $600 (h0 = 6). In what follows, when we refer to the “actual” system, we mean the LFA variant, and analyze
how the planner would deliver the same utility entitlement implicit in the LFA version of the actual program.
At the end of this section, we comment on how the results diﬀer when we consider the HCD variant.30 The
average public expenditure per month (during the entire lifetime of the worker) implicit in the current system
amounts to $215 for the high-skilled type and $247 for the low-skilled type, suggesting that low-skilled workers
are more expensive, mainly due to their lower job-ﬁnding rates.
Figure 6 contrasts some key features of the optimal WTW program to the features of the actual U.S. welfare
system for these two types of workers. Recall that in our simulations the evolution of h is stochastic, and both
payments and policy assignments depend on h. In order to provide a general idea of the main quantitative
features of the optimal WTW program, for each type of worker we generate 10;000 histories of human capital
shocks, and shocks to the training and search outcomes (success/failure). We then calculate sample averages of
the optimal time-path of payments upon unemployment, taxes/subsidies upon employment, and compute the
fraction of workers assigned to each policy since the initial displacement.
Optimal sequence of policies: The right hand side panels displays the fractions of workers assigned to
the various policies at each unemployment duration. All high-skill workers start in UI, exactly like the actual
29In computing these values, we always let the worker optimally choose between high and low eﬀort, except when she
is in the job-search monitoring phase of the program, where high search eﬀort is perfectly enforced.
30In the numerical solution, we discretize h while we treat U as a continuous variable. We assume that h can take
only values over a discrete set and choose a grid with 30 points geometrically spaced over the range [0;20]. The grid for
U has 500 equidistant points in the interval [100;700]: For given h; the value functions with respect to U are computed
using Chebyshev polynomials up to the 20th order. Details of the computation procedure are available upon request.
30scheme. As human capital depreciates, workers begin to be gradually moved to JM, and the fraction of workers
in UI decreases while that in JM steadily increases. After roughly 2 years of unemployment, the fraction of
workers in JM also begins to fall as the ﬂow from JM into SA more than counterbalances that from UI into
JM. For suﬃciently long durations, all unemployed workers end up in SA: The typical policy sequence of the
optimal WTW program for a high-skilled worker is therefore UI-JM-SA. The median duration of each stage is
24 months for UI and 8 months for JM: Recall that in the actual program, UI beneﬁts are paid for 6 months
and the combination of active policies (JM and TR) lasts for 24 months. Therefore, the median duration of
the pre-SA phase of the optimal program (32 months) is remarkably close to the actual one, estimated at 30
months.
A striking feature of the optimal program for high-skill workers is that only a negligible fraction is ever
assigned to basic training. In terms of the (U;h) space, training appears only in a tiny region which skilled
workers reach only under very few histories of human capital depreciation.
The unskilled workers start oﬀ in UI as well, but a large fraction of them moves straight into SA, without
any treatment through search monitoring or training. The reason for this lower transition rate across policies lies
in the shape of the hazard function. As is clear from Figure 5, since for high levels of human capital the hazard
is much steeper than for low levels, skill depreciation induces a bigger rise in the incentive cost for high-skill
types, making JM more attractive. Interestingly, when they transit across programs, low-skilled workers are
assigned more often to training than their high-skill counterparts: after a ﬁrst stage of UI, the optimal program
mixes JM and, to a much less extent, TR. The median duration of UI is 30 months; those workers who are
subject to active policies during unemployment spend a median time of 4 months in JM and 3 months in TR:
Overall, the optimal WTW program features longer unemployment insurance than the actual scheme and,
for skilled workers, uses search monitoring quite heavily, in line with LFA programs in the U.S., whereas it
makes only very limited use of basic education for the low-skill workers.31 Simply put, it appears that TR is
too expensive and less eﬀective compared to the other options available to the planner. Recall that we argued
that our calibrated returns to basic education are on the high end of the existing estimates, thus the reason
why TR is barely chosen is not one of negative net returns of this policy per se (as often argued in the empirical
evaluation literature), but rather one of opportunity cost for the planner of giving up more eﬀective instruments.
Unemployment beneﬁts and wage subsidies: The upper-middle panel shows that, for skilled workers,
the average optimal replacement ratio for welfare beneﬁts (the solid line) is more generous than the actual
scheme (the dotted line). The optimal payments decrease smoothly from 95% to 75% of the pre-displacement
wage, while the payments in the existing U.S. program never exceed 80% of the pre-displacement wage for our
benchmark worker, and drop to 19% after 30 months. This higher beneﬁt level of the optimal WTW program
31Given that our TR technology is calibrated on basic adult education programs oﬀering GED or high-school equivalent
degrees, it is reasonable to obtain that only our low-skilled types (e.g., high-school dropouts) should be assigned to TR
during unemployment.
31is entirely linked to the expected utility entitlement oﬀered by the current system.32 The fact that the optimal
beneﬁts decline so smoothly implies that the interest tax needed to implement the program when workers have
access to credit markets would be only 0:9%:
In the upper-right panel, we compare the optimal and actual (the latter made up by FUTA and EITC)
structure of earnings subsidies as a fraction of the re-employment wage. Note that the dependence of the actual
subsidy on duration is not directly imposed by the legislation, but it occurs anyway through the depreciation of
earnings power during the unemployment spell.33 The optimal scheme traces quite closely the actual subsidy
(around 15%) for the ﬁrst year, but subsequently it increases much less with duration, so for long durations the
optimal subsidy ends up being just 2/3 of the actual one. The presence of a subsidy in the optimal program
is in sharp contrast with what Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) found for the stationary model without human
capital depreciation. In Section 4.4 we discussed in detail the mechanism generating such result; in particular,
recall that the subsidy rises fast in correspondence to the phase where JM is used more intensively.
In the bottom-middle and bottom-right panels of Figure 6 we report beneﬁts and subsidies for the low-skill
workers with pre-displacement monthly earnings of $600: The optimal sequence of beneﬁts declines faster than
for the skilled workers (from 94% to 66% in 5 years) due to the more intense use of incentive-based policies
like UI and TR, compared to JM: The current system appears to underinsure the unskilled worker at long
durations–as for the high-skill type–but it provides too much insurance at short durations, with replacement
ratios exceeding 100%. Once again, the optimal subsidy is substantially smaller than the actual one, by at least
10%.
To conclude, for skilled workers in our group, the current system exceeds in providing incentives through
the static margin, by over-rewarding employment and over-punishing unemployment. In doing so, it does
not provide enough insurance. For unskilled workers instead, the existing scheme under-provides incentives,
especially at short durations.
Budget savings and welfare gains: The government budget savings are calculated by comparing the
actual expenditures ¯ V0 (h0) to the expenditures V
¡¯ U0 (h0);h0
¢
that the planner would incur by delivering
utility ¯ U0 (h0) under the optimal program. The welfare gains are computed by comparing the actual utility
entitlement of the current system ¯ U0 (h0) with the level U0 (h0) that the planner can deliver by spending exactly
as much as the actual program in the optimal scheme, i.e., U0 (h0) solves the equation
V(U0 (h0);h0) = ¯ V (h0):
The welfare gain is then expressed in terms of fraction of lifetime consumption.
32Also Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) uncovered very high replacement rates, close to 100%, in the optimal UI scheme
(with employment taxes) that oﬀers the same discounted utility as the actual program.
33The tax/subsidy paid by the current U.S. scheme is computed by applying the rules for FUTA and EITC to each
simulated history, and averaging out across histories. The calculation of the optimal tax/subsidy is similar, except that
we excluded observations where the worker in SA since it is an absorbing state with no re-employment possibility.
32For our high-skill workers, the cost savings are of the order of 4% and the welfare gain is 0:3% of lifetime con-
sumption. Such small welfare gain is due to the fact that skilled workers have very low unemployment durations
(over 80% ﬁnd a job within 6 months), so they quickly join the employment ranks and, upon employment, the
actual wage subsidy is quite close to the optimal subsidy. For low-skill workers, instead, budget savings are just
below 35% and the welfare gain of switching to the optimal program amounts to 5:8% of lifetime consumption,
suggesting that the existing scheme could be substantially improved.
Comparison with HCD programs: When ¯ U0 is calibrated according to the HCD variant, the optimal
WTW program presents very similar features, with slightly less generous payments in both states since the
calculated initial utility entitlement under HCD is smaller than that computed under the LFA option. This is
not surprising, given that training is not used much in the optimal WTW program. As a result, budget savings
and welfare gains of shifting to the optimal WTW program are larger. For the skilled workers, cost savings
reach 22% and welfare gains can be up to 1:5% of lifetime consumption; for the unskilled, we obtain budget
savings beyond 50% and welfare gains around 8:8%:
If one wishes to draw some simple policy lessons from our analysis, perhaps the central ﬁndings are two.
First, with respect to the choice among “active policy” instruments given the available technologies (i.e., costs
and returns), programs focusing on search monitoring seem to be better designed than programs centered on
basic adult education. Therefore, our analysis, which comes from a completely diﬀerent angle, reinforces the
typical ﬁndings of the evaluation literature (Heckman, LaLonde and Smith, 1999). Second, with respect to
beneﬁts and subsidies, a reformed system should oﬀer more insurance to the skilled unemployed workers and
provide more incentives for the unskilled.
7 Concluding Remarks
Welfare-to-Work programs combine passive and active labor market policies in an attempt to solve a complex
trade-oﬀ between providing insurance to jobless workers and oﬀering an incentive structure that will move them
quickly among employment ranks.
In this paper we have provided a theoretical framework to study welfare-to-work programs from a pure
normative standpoint. We have tried to tackle a large set of important questions, such as: What is the optimal
sequence of policies in an optimal WTW program? And, how long should each policy stage be? What is the
optimal level and dynamics of payments in each phase of the program? Should wages upon re-employment be
taxed or subsidized? Our theoretical characterization oﬀers sharp answers to some of these questions, but only
general guidelines to other questions. In this latter case, we showed how a numerical analysis based on the
calibrated model does an exhaustive job and can be used for quantitative policy analysis.
33Overall, our work represents a ﬁrst step toward a better understanding of the optimal design of WTW
programs. As such, it has a number of limitations that future research on the topic should address.
By introducing a separation probability during employment, one can make both labor market states transient
and characterize the stationary distribution of workers over the state vector (U;h;z): This more general problem
would also allow one to deﬁne an economy-wide government budget constraint and determine endogenously the
initial utility entitlement U0 associated to the self-ﬁnancing optimal WTW program. Such a program would
also allow one to analyze the optimal cross subsidization between workers with diﬀerent skill levels. A richer
model would also incorporate incentive problems during employment and assign a more prominent role to the
ﬁrm in the analysis, as in Zhao (2001) and, more recently, Blanchard and Tirole (2004). Looking further ahead,
equilibrium eﬀects of large-scale programs should be considered in the analysis.
Some of the active policies we studied could, arguably, be modelled diﬀerently. For example, on-the-job
training implicit in publicly funded transitional employment could be more eﬀective than the basic classroom
training we analyzed in the quantitative section (see Kirby et al., 2002, for a comprehensive evaluation of
these “work-ﬁrst” programs). Or, monitoring training eﬀort at a cost may turn out to be eﬀective. Further,
the objective of the job-search monitoring program we modelled is exclusively that of enforcing search eﬀort.
Often, these programs also aim at improving workers’ search eﬀectiveness–for any given eﬀort level–by providing
counselling and explicit job placement services, an aspect we have neglected in our analysis. The challenge, as
emphasized by Meyer (1995), is to obtain reliable data to separate these two aspects of job-search assistance
policies. In the rare instances where the data allow it (e.g., van den Berg and van der Klaauw, 2001, for
the Netherlands), the conclusion is that the aspect we have emphasized in this paper, monitoring, is far more
eﬀective.
Even though we compare quantitatively the optimal WTW program to the current U.S. welfare scheme,
we have not questioned in depth the role of the government in providing insurance to the unemployed and
credit for training. Theoretically, Abraham and Pavoni (2004) prove that in the presence of moral hazard
due to hidden action (hence, diﬀerently from the hidden information case of Cole and Kocherlakota, 2001) the
constrained-eﬃcient allocations improve upon self-insurance even with hidden savings, which means that, at
least qualitatively, in our economy there is scope for government-sponsored programs. Quantitatively, it remains
to be established whether their welfare gains are sizeable. Some empirical studies hint that this could be the
case. Gruber (1997) ﬁnds that unemployment compensation is a decisive help in consumption smoothing for
the U.S. unemployed; Chapman, Crossley and Kim (2003) ﬁnd that, in Canada, a signiﬁcant fraction of job
seekers are credit-constrained in the choice of acquiring private training.
A separate question is whether, in our environment, a simpler welfare scheme (i.e., not fully history depen-
dent) would achieve similar gains. The pioneering work of Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992) and more recently
that of Wang and Williamson (2002) and Abdulkadiroglu, Kuruscu and Sahin (2002) tackles this issue in
diﬀerent environments.
34Finally, one could choose to answer the set of questions we laid out from a diﬀerent angle, i.e., adverse selec-
tion instead of moral hazard. Unobserved heterogeneity in “types” of workers (e.g., with high/low productivity,
or high/low job ﬁnding rate) will induce the planner to optimally screen workers through a menu of alternative
programs and payments. We defer all these considerations to ongoing and future research.
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388 Appendix A: Sequential Formulation
History: The world starts with an exogenously given initial condition (z0;h0;y0); where z0 2 fze;zug is the
initial employment status of the worker, h0 2 H is its level of human capital, and y0 2 fs;fg is the outcome of
the worker’s activity. At the beginning of each period t, the outcome xt of a uniform [0;1] random variable Xt
is publicly observed. The random variables fXtg are serially uncorrelated and independent of any choice made
by the agent or the planner. Let ¾t = fz0;h0;y0;x0;:::;zt;ht;yt;xtg be a history up to time t:
Contract: Let W (z0;h0;y0) = fc;a;d;mg = fct (¾t);at (¾t);dt (¾t);mt (¾t)g
1
t=0 to denote the contract,
where
– ct (¾t) is the transfer function, with ct (¾t) ¸ 0 for any ¾t: Denote by c(x¿) the continuation plan of
transfers after history x¿, i.e., ct (x¿) = fct+n (¾t+n)g
1
n=0 = ¾t






f0;eg if zt = zu;
e if zt = ze;
i.e., employment is deﬁned as a state where the worker is productive and production requires the high
eﬀort level e. Denote by at (¾¿) the continuation plan of eﬀort choices after node ¾¿ and by At (¾¿) the
set of all admissible continuation plans, after history ¾¿.
– dt (¾t) is the activity. If zt = zu, then dt (¾t) 2 fsearch;traing. When zt = ze, dt (¾t) equals to a
singleton that we might call “work”. Once again, dt (¾¿) will denote the continuation plan of activities
after node ¾¿.
– mt (¾t) 2 f0;1g is a dummy variable for the use of the search-eﬀort monitoring technology, with mt (¾¿)
denoting the continuation plan contingent on history ¾¿.































we assume that Ut (W;¾t) is well deﬁned for all (W;¾t):
Incentive compatibility: In our framework, (zt;ht;yt;xt) is fully observable. We also assume that the
activity dt (search, train, work) is observable and enforceable by the planner, hence “contractible”. Because
of the existence of the monitoring technology, at every node with mt (¾t) = 1, the eﬀort chosen by the agent
should be included in the set of contractible variables.
Deﬁne by am
t (¾t) ½ at (¾t) the sub-plan of actions which are not contractible under the monitoring plan
m: We then have that am
t (¾t) = at (¾t) if and only if mt (¾t) = 0: In order to generate the sub-plan am we
simply delete the element at (¾t) from a whenever mt (¾t) = 1. We are now ready to deﬁne the set of incentive








where, ˆ at (¾t) can diﬀer from at (¾t) only on the non-contractible components am
t (¾t): Notice that in order to
lighten notation, we have omitted the argument (¾t) from the continuation plans.
Planner problem: In the sequential representation of the contractual relationship, the planner solves
























U0 (W;¾0)dx0 ¸ U0 and IC(¾t) for all ¾t j ¾0;
39where the return function during employment is r(ht;ze;mt (¾t);dt (¾t)) = w(ht); and during unemployment
is r(ht;zu;mt (¾t);dt (¾t)) = ¡·(mt (¾t);dt (¾t)); with the costs given by ·(0;search) = 0; ·(1;search) =
·JM > 0; ·(0;train) = ·TR > 0; ·(1;train) = +1:
Options of the contract during unemployment: The table below represents all the admissible com-
binations of eﬀort, activity and monitoring the planner can implement at every node. The entry £ in a cell
means that this option is never chosen by a welfare maximizing planner, whereas the entry ¤ denotes an option
that can be optimal at some point during the contract.
dt = search dt = train
mt = 0 mt = 1 mt = 0 mt = 1
at = e ¤ (UI) ¤ (JM) ¤ (TR) £
at = 0 ¤ (SA) £ £ £
The last entry in the ﬁrst line is due to the assumption that monitoring eﬀort perfectly during training is
prohibitively costly: The entries in the second line (at = 0) can be explained as follows. Choosing zero search
eﬀort and at the same time monitoring workers’ eﬀort is not optimal since in this case the moral hazard problem
disappears: because ¼ (0;ht) = 0; yt+1 = s is never an equilibrium outcome, the planner can implement at = 0
by threatening an inﬁnite punishment, for example, no beneﬁts, oﬀ the equilibrium (i.e., whenever yt+1 = s).
Choosing zero eﬀort during training is never optimal since, whenever a = 0; the training technology is ineﬀective,
hence the planner will always prefer to implement search without monitoring which is cheaper and leads to the
same outcome (y = f).
The planner can therefore restrict attention to the four remaining options labelled, respectively, Unemploy-
ment Insurance (UI), Job-search Monitoring (JM), Training (TR), and Social Assistance (SA), described in
more detail in the main text.
Recursive formulation: The state space can be described as a correspondence Γ(h;z) from all the pairs




U : 9 W satisfying IC(¾t) 8¾t j ¾0;
Z 1
0
U0 (W;¾0)dx0 = U; (h0;z0) = (h;z)
¾
;
where we have omitted y0 from the initial conditions since it is payoﬀ irrelevant for both the agent and the
planner.
A straightforward extension of the standard recursive-contracts methodology (e.g., Spear and Srivastava,
1987) delivers the recursive formulation of the principal-agent problem in terms of the triple (U;h;z) we propose
in the text. Below we will show that the functions solving the Bellman equation are bounded and continuous.
Moreover, it is easy to show that by the Maximum Theorem the policy correspondence admits a (Borel)
measurable selection. The usual veriﬁcation theorem (SLP, Theorem 9.2) hence implies that the recursive
formulation of the problem fully characterizes the optimal program.
9 Appendix B: Proofs
Some steps in the proofs of this Appendix are only sketched. The full-length proofs are contained in the
companion Technical Appendix (Pavoni and Violante, 2005).
Proposition 0: properties of the value functions
Proposition 0 below states formally several technical properties of the value functions which have been
brieﬂy discussed in the main text.
40Proposition 0: (i) The functions W;V and V i are concave in U (for all h). (ii) They are jointly
continuous in (U;h) and monotonically increasing in h: (iii) Let i¤ (U;h) be the implemented policy and
c¤ (U;h) > 0 be the optimal payment at (U;h):Then bothV and V i are decreasing and continuously diﬀerentiable
with respect to the ﬁrst argument at(U;h) with
VU (U;h) = V
i
¤(U;h)




Proof: We can apply the well known results in Stokey, Lucas and Prescott (1989, thereafter, SLP) (chs. 4.2
and 9.2) to the Bellman operator V i associated to the problems deﬁning the various policies fUI;JM;SA;TRg
and show that it preserves boundedness, continuity, concavity and monotonicity. This is all standard. The
possibility of using randomized policy and utility assignments also permits one to ‘convexify’ the upper envelope
function V deﬁned in (3) and to obtain concavity of the functions V i and V deﬁned in (4). This is Lemma
A1 in the Technical Appendix. Lemma A2 in the Technical Appendix shows that the integral in (4) preserves
boundedness, continuity, and monotonicity. That W in (10) is bounded, continuous, concave and monotone is
obvious. Since the operator is a contraction, its ﬁxed point will possess such properties as well. Finally, given
concavity, diﬀerentiability of V i can now be shown by using standard arguments (SLP, Theorems 4.11-12). The
conditions for V and V i displayed above follow immediately from the envelope theorem. See the Technical
Appendix for a more extended proof. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1: SA absorbing
Although the result is very intuitive, the proof is non-trivial. The reason is that we must rule out situa-
tions where SA is used at an early stage of the program for the sole purpose of allowing randomizations over
policies with diﬀerent implicit eﬀort levels. The statement of Proposition 1 must therefore be re-formulated in
probabilistic terms. Formally, we will show the following (equivalent, in probabilistic terms to the statement of
Proposition 1).
Proposition 1A: In order for a program to be strictly optimal at node (U;ht), it cannot be that at such
node SA is implemented with positive probability and, in period t + 1, a diﬀerent policy is implemented after
SA, with positive probability.
Proof: For the sake of contradiction, suppose (without loss of generality) that there is an optimal plan W
implementing SA in period t almost surely for all xt; and policy i 6= SA in period t + 1 for a positive measure
of shocks xt+1. The stated sequence (SA followed by policy i 6= SA) cannot be part of an optimal program.
We will show that the planner can provide the agent with the same expected utility as under W at a lower
cost, by designing an alternative plan W0 which uses a randomization between two branches. Branch 1: his
branch is implemented with probability ¯ (i.e. equal to the discount factor). In this branch the new program
W0 implements exactly the same (randomization of) policies following SA in the original program W, and it
delivers the same lifetime utility. Branch 2: With probability (1 ¡ ¯); the planner implements SA forever and
transfers to the agent the same consumption level as that paid in the ﬁrst period of the original plan W (recall
that the W plan always implements SA at time t).
By construction, the new plan W0 provides the agent with the same ex-ante utility as under the original
program W. It turns out, though, that W0 is also cost-reducing compared to W, essentially because it uses
policies i 6= SA (e.g., UI or JM) for higher levels of human capital (ht ¸ ht+1), which relaxes the incentive
compatibility (IC) constraint and increases expected returns to search. See the Technical Appendix for the
detailed proof. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: economy without human capital dynamics
SA: Proposition 1 shows that SA is an absorbing policy for the general case.
41JM: In order to show the absorbing property of JM, note that the ﬁrst order conditions are VU (U) =
V JM
U (U) = VU
¡
Uf¢
: This implies that setting Uf = U is optimal. As a consequence, implementing the same
policy, i.e. JM, every period is part of an optimal program. Clearly, whenever V is strictly concave this
absorbing policy is the unique optimal one. Given the absence of the IC constraint, the absorbing nature of
JM implies that consumption remains constant once the worker enters JM.
UI: The proof that UI is absorbing is quite involved. Let us start by stating the ﬁrst-order and envelope
conditions under UI:



















where ¹ ¸ 0 is the multiplier on the incentive compatibility constraint. It is useful to begin by stating the
conditions under which the incentive constraint is binding and promised utility declines.
Lemma A3: At any U0 where UI is optimal, we must have Uf < U0: Moreover, if V is strictly concave
to the left of U0, then it must be that ¹ > 0:
Proof. See Technical Appendix.
It is immediate from (14) that if the incentive compatibility constraint binds, then Uf < U0: When it
does not bind, then the planner can fully insure the worker upon success of search. The same result can then
be obtained using the constraint (IC1) with strict inequality and the full-insurance version of the continuation
utility Us = (1¡¯)u(c) into the promise-keeping constraint. Since each function V i is continuous by Proposition
0, if for diﬀerent levels of utility diﬀerent policies are preferred, the value functions must cross each other.
Lemma A4: For every U we have that V SA
U (U) ¸ V UI
U (U):
Proof. See Technical Appendix.
This lemma is very intuitive: in UI, a rise in U increases the incentive cost and the eﬀort compensation
cost, reducing V UI, whereas SA is a policy without IC problems and where eﬀort is not required, so V SA is
ﬂatter with respect to U: Note that Lemma A3 and Lemma A4 imply that SA will not follow UI: if UI is
optimal at U0; then next period Uf < U0 (by the ﬁrst part of Lemma A3) which reinforces the optimality of
UI relative to SA (by Lemma A4).
Lemma A5: Let U0 be such that V JM (U0) = V UI (U0): Then, we have V JM
U (U0) ¸ V UI
U (U0) so V UI
crosses V JM from above at most once.
Proof. See Technical Appendix.
The intuition of the proof is the following. We know that JM is an absorbing policy, so when the worker
enters into JM; even though he is asked to always supply positive eﬀort, he will never be subject to random
consumption sequences. We also know that after implementing UI; an optimal program never uses policy SA:
This implies that once the worker is assigned to policy UI; she will always be required to supply positive eﬀort
thereafter, as in JM. In addition to that, she will possibly face random consumption due to the IC constraint.
Given our assumption that 1=u0 is a convex function, this extra randomization on consumption will induce extra
costs for the planner which will make V UI more negatively sloped than V JM: This statement is formally shown
in Lemma A6 of the TA. The proof of Lemma A5 heavily builds on that, and takes care of only ‘oﬀ-the-optimum’
behavior.
42It remains to be shown that UI cannot be followed by JM. By Lemma A3, during UI we have that Uf < U0
and by Lemma A5 if UI dominates JM at U0, it still dominates JM at Uf < U0 which concludes the proof:
the only policy that can optimally follow UI is UI itself. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary to Proposition 2: slopes
The ranking between V UI and V JM at the crossing point has been shown in Lemma A5. The proof that
ˆ V SA
U (U) ¸ V JM
U (U) is based on the idea that under JM the agent is required to supply positive eﬀort at least
in the ﬁrst period of JM, therefore the marginal cost for the planner of providing a given level of utility must
be larger than that under SA, a policy with full insurance and a = 0 forever. See the Technical Appendix for
details. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: slopes wrt U in the general case
That ˆ V SA
U (U) ¸ V JM
U (U;h) can be easily derived in the general case with human capital dynamics by
following exactly the same lines of proof proposed for the Corollary to Proposition 2, without relying on any
additional assumption on the curvature of V.























































The ﬁrst row is derived using the envelope condition and the promise-keeping constraint. The second row is
obtained directly from the ﬁrst order conditions under UI: The equality in the last line is due to the deﬁnition
of ´. Now, consider JM. We have
¡V JM
U (U;h) = g0
³
U + e ¡ ¯
h
¼ (h)Us

















The equality in the ﬁrst row uses the envelope condition and the promise-keeping constraint. The ﬁrst and second
equalities in the second row use the ﬁrst order conditions under JM and the shape of W, respectively. The
equality in the last row uses again the ﬁrst order conditions under JM: Now, if ¡V UI
U (U;h) ¸ ¡V JM
U (U;h) we
are done. We must therefore rule out the possibility that ¡V UI
U (U;h) < ¡V JM
U (U;h): For this purpose, assume
that the last inequality is in fact true. We are looking for a contradiction. First of all, recall that because
of incentive constraints we have ¡V UI























UI: From our assumption on V; and
















Now, the convexity of g0 also implies that condition (15), together with the Jensen’s inequality, yields
¡V UI









+ (1 ¡ ¼ (h))´
¸¶
:
43Comparing this condition with the ﬁrst line of (16), it is easy to see that whenever U
f
UI + e
¯ + (1 ¡ ¼ (h))´ ¸
U
f
JM +´, we directly get a contradiction to the statement ¡V UI
U (U;h) < ¡V JM
U (U;h); and we are done. Finally,
assume instead the complementary inequality. Multiplying all by ¯ and rearranging, it becomes
¯U
f
UI + e < ¯U
f
JM + ¼ (h)´: (18)
Now, since from (17) and the second line of (16) we have Us
JM · U
f








¸ e ¡ ¯U
f
JM + ¯¼ (h)´:
In other words, if condition (18) is true, we get e¡¯U
f
JM +¯¼ (h)´ > ¡¯U
f
UI: But comparing the ﬁrst lines of
(15) and (16), we get ¡V UI
U (U;h) ¸ ¡V JM
U (U;h), again a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: slopes wrt h in the general case
That ˆ V SA
h = 0 is obvious since ˆ V SA (U;h) = ¡
u
¡1((1¡¯)U)
1¡¯ . Since for i = JM;UI the value functions V i
are monotonically increasing in h, we just have to show the ﬁrst inequality in the proposition. Fix U0 and recall
the planner’s problem under JM: By the envelope theorem we have
V JM


























where the subscript JM indicates that Us and Uf are the optimal choices under policy JM: Consider now the UI
policy. Clearly, if at (U0;h) the incentive compatibility under UI is not binding, then V UI
h (U0;h) = V JM
h (U0;h)
as UI and JM solve essentially the same problem and ·JM does not depend on h: In what follows, we assume the
incentive compatibility is binding. Substituting the incentive compatibility into the promise keeping constraint,
diﬀerentiating the value function with respect to h, and using the envelope theorem, after rearranging we obtain
V UI


































where we used the subscript UI notation for the optimal choices under policy UI: Recall that from the IC




¼(h). We now show that the above expression is lower than the expression in
(19). In light of (19), since ¯¼0 (h) ¸ 0; the desired inequality V UI
h (U0;h) ¸ V JM
h (U0;h) will be shown for all h
















































We now show (20). First, the separable form of W (displayed by condition (10) in the main text) implies
that the derivative Wh does not depend on Us: Since hf is the same, Wh is the same across the two policies,




























































which implies cJM < cUI: Then, the ﬁrst-order conditions (22) and the concavity of W imply that Us
UI ¸ Us
JM
which leads to a contradiction: payments and continuation utilities in JM are lower than those under UI; and
eﬀort is required under both policies, therefore UI and JM cannot deliver to the agent the same promised




UI must be true and so does inequality (20).












































































































UI and V is steeper than W for all h. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5: optimal policy sequence
We ﬁrst describe the dynamics of U during JM :
Lemma A7: Assume that V is submodular and recall that it is a concave function. If at (U;h) either one
of these properties (submodularity or concavity) is strict, and the implemented policy is JM, then Uf (x) ¸ U
almost surely for all x 2 [0;1]:
Proof. The ﬁrst order conditions under JM imply
VU (U;h) = V JM






for (almost) all x 2 [0;1]: Since hf · h, sub-modularity implies that VU
¡
U;hf¢
¸ VU (U;h): Since V is
concave, if either one of the properties of V is strict at (U;h), we have the desired result. Q.E.D.
Since hf · h; the proof of the proposition is now trivial from the graphical representation and the utility
dynamics of Lemma A7. The only important remark to make is that in this lemma not only have we established
45that Uf ¸ U in expected terms, but we have also shown that the continuation utility increases almost surely
for all realizations of X. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6: no duration dependence
The line of proof is an extension to that adopted for Proposition 1 (SA absorbing). For the sake of
contradiction, assume that at node (Ut;ht) there is an optimal plan W implementing JM in period t almost
surely for all xt; and UI in period t+1 for a full measure of shocks. We allow for any random plan from period
t + 1onward.
The idea of the proof is again that we can construct an alternative plan delivering the same ex-ante expected
utility to the agent, and larger net returns for the planner. This plan can be generated as follows. First, construct
a plan W0 delivering the same ex-ante expected utility to the agent, and same net returns for the planner. Next,
show that in the new plan the IC constraints are relaxed with respect to W in some states, thus costs can be
further reduced and W cannot be optimal.
The program W0 consists of two branches. Branch 1: with probability ¯ (1 ¡ ¼) the new plan W0 starts with
policy UI at time t and then continues by implementing a contingent plan which can be constructed forward
from W as follows. Each time in the original plan we see UI or JM we retain UI or JM, but whenever in
the old plan we see SA ! SA ! SA::: (notice that from Proposition 1 this is the only possibility) then we
substitute this sequence with JM ! SA ! SA::: Branch 2: with probability 1 ¡ ¯ (1 ¡ ¼) W0 starts with JM
at time t and then, as for Branch 1, whenever in the original plan W one sees SA ! SA ! SA::: then replace
it with JM ! SA ! SA::: Moreover, each time in the original plan we see JM we retain JM: Finally, each
time in the old plan we see UI; we replace it with JM:
Consider now the payments in plan W0. Let ct be the payment made under W in period t (notice that
because of full insurance during JM, this must be the same for all xt and across states). In branch 1 we have
the following. First, every time the new plan implements UI the planner pays the agent exactly what was paid
to her in the old plan during this policy at this node, both in case of success and of failure of search. Whenever
W0 implements SA the agent gets exactly the same consumption as in the old plan at that node. The payments
under JM are as follows: whenever JM is implemented in order to replace JM in the old plan, the payments
are again exactly the same as those in the old plan, in all states. When JM is implemented (for one period)
in order to replace the ﬁrst period of SA instead, then the transfers are those made in SA in the old plan at
that node. In branch 2, the new plan transfers ct to the agent in any period, history of shocks, and states. Her
expected utility is u(ct)=(1 ¡ ¯ (1 ¡ ¼)):
It is now straightforward to check that the stated plan W0 delivers the same ex-ante utility to the agent,
and the same net return to the planner. We begin by showing the equivalence of the two programs with respect
to the monitoring costs for the planner, in two steps.
Step 1: In branch 1, with weight ¯ (1 ¡ ¼), the only additional monitoring costs with respect to the con-
tinuation of the old plan W is borne whenever the latter contemplated SA for the ﬁrst time. Let q be the
probability of such event. Note now that this same additional cost occurs also in the second branch, which has
weight 1 ¡ ¯ (1 ¡ ¼). So, up to now, we conclude that the new plan yields additional costs with respect to the
t + 1-continuation of the old plan equal to q·JM.
Step 2: Recall that in the ﬁrst period of program W the planner pays an initial monitoring cost ·JM
with certainty. Consider now branch 2. If the plan always implemented JM, we would have a cost ·JM with
probability (1 ¡ ¼) every period, so we would get precisely a discounted present value of the monitoring costs
equal to ·JM, which is the initial cost of the old plan. But the cost in branch 2 is smaller since there is a
tail, occurring with probability q, where the cost is not paid because the new plan picks SA from then onward.
The reduction in cost associated to this tail, compared to the unlimited implementation of JM, is ¡q ·
JM
1¡¯(1¡¼)
which, weighted with the probability of branch 2 occurring, yields exactly ¡q·JM, the excess cost of the new
plan computed in Step 1, which proves that the expected discounted monitoring cost in the two programs must
be the same.
46The wage returns for the planner must also be the same. The new program implements positive search
eﬀort if and only if a positive eﬀort was implemented in the original program for the same level of h, with
exactly the same probabilities as in the old plan. In particular, recall that the new plan starts in period t but
it is constructed based in what happens in the original plan at date t + 1: Implementing JM for one more
period whenever the old plan implemented SA guarantees precisely that a = 0 is chosen in the new plan only
for values of human capital for which the old plan recommended a = 0: The logic used above for the monitoring
cost can then be easily extended to also show that - for each ht - the probability for which either a = 0 or a = e
is implemented is the same between the two plans. This implies that the agent’s eﬀort cost is the same in the
two plans as well.
Moreover, the payments are the same in the two programs. Branch 1 of the new plan can be thought of
as the continuation of the old plan from time t + 1 onward, since it has weight ¯ (1 ¡ ¼). It is easy to see
that the total value of payments is exactly the same as that paid in the old plan from unemployment duration
t + 1 onward. In branch 2 payments are like in the old plan, so the discounted present value of payments in
branch 2 equals ct=(1 ¡ ¯ (1 ¡ ¼)) = ct + ¯¼ ct
1¡¯, the consumption paid in the old plan during the ﬁrst period
of unemployment and upon employment. Precisely the missing part in order to get the total payment bill.
Finally, notice that under W0 the incentive constraint in UI is relaxed with respect to W; since W0 reduces
utility Uf upon failure of search. This is so since W0 implements JM instead of SA for one more period at later
dates, and JM involves a positive eﬀort cost. This allows the planner to further improve upon W0 by reducing
consumption dispersion (hence, average transfers). The Technical Appendix contains a fully detailed proof of
this Proposition. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7: payments in UI, JM, and SA































where cf is the consumption payment in case of unsuccessful search, the result follows immediately from the
strict concavity of u.





























¡ cs: Since !
¡
hf¢
increases with hf; and hf increases with h, the result is immediate.
(iii) It is obvious and the proof is omitted.
47(iv) The shape of W in (10) implies that the net wage cs
t satisﬁes cs
t = (1 ¡ ¯)Us
t , thus the tax in this
case is simply ! ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)Us
t . In JM promised utility is constant, so the result follows easily. Consider UI:
Recall that in the proof of Proposition 2 we have shown that in an economy without human capital dynamics
UI is absorbing and the incentive compatibility constraint is binding (¹ > 0). From Lemma A3, Uf < U:









t : The desired result is now immediate since Us
t+1 < Us
t . Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 8: payments in TR
























for y = s;f
from which we easily obtain the desired result. Q.E.D.
10 Appendix C: Estimation of the Hazard Function
Data Description: From the Basic Monthly Current Population Survey (CPS), we selected every worker
between 18-50-years-old with at most a high-school degree who reports to be unemployed during the months
May 1995-April 1996. This initial sample includes 18;910 observations. However, part of these observations
refer to the same individual and the same unemployment spell, since some of the households are interviewed
for several consecutive months. In these cases, we selected only the most recent available record on the length
of each unemployment spell. The ﬁnal sample comprises N = 15;100 ongoing spells of unemployment. The
median duration is 8 months, the 25th percentile is 3 months and the 75th percentile is 21 months. The mean
monthly earnings for workers in our sample are just below $1,500.
Estimation: The statistical problems with this type of data are two: right censoring and length bias. We
follow Flinn (1986) in dealing with these two issues. We assume that the true distribution of unemployment
spells is a Weibull with scaling parameter ® and shape parameter ¸. Let F be the Weibull distribution function










The estimation yields ˆ ® = 0:474 (0:017) and ˆ ¸ = 0:661 (0:027). The implied hazard function displays
negative duration dependence, especially in the ﬁrst 12 months of unemployment where the exit rate falls by
half (top panel of Figure 5).
We divided the sample into subgroups based on gender and education, but we did not ﬁnd any statistically
signiﬁcant evidence of heterogeneity across groups. We followed Flinn (1986) and introduced unobserved het-
erogeneity through a binomial distribution over the scale parameter ®, but once again the diﬀerences in the
estimates of ® for the two groups were not statistically signiﬁcant. This ﬁnding is not surprising, given the
homogeneity of our education group.
48From durations to human capital: The estimated hazard is a function of unemployment duration, but
in the model it is a function of human capital. In order to map duration into human capital all we need is
the initial level of human capital (pre-displacement wage) and the monthly rate of human capital depreciation.
Average monthly earnings of the workers in the CPS sample are $1;500, thus we used an initial value of h = 15
and reconstructed human capital as a function of duration through the assumed depreciation rate.
Figure 5 (lower panel) plots the hazard as a function of human capital. Based on an annual depreciation
rate of 15%, the market value of skills drops by half after roughly 50 months.
11 Appendix D: The U.S. Welfare System
In what follows, we describe the pivotal ingredients of the U.S. welfare system, which are then summarized into
the “actual” U.S. WTW program of Section 6.1.4.
Unemployment Insurance: The unemployment insurance replacement ratio in the U.S. varies across
states. The state-determined weekly beneﬁts generally replace between 50% and 70% of the individual’s last
weekly pre-tax earnings. The regular state programs usually provide beneﬁts up to 26 weeks. The permanent
Federal-State Extended Beneﬁts program, present in every State, extends coverage up to 13 additional weeks,
for a combined maximum of 39 weeks. Weekly beneﬁts under the extended program are identical to those of
the regular program.34
TANF: The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program is the main cash assistance program
for poor families with children under age 18 and at least one unemployed parent. It was implemented in 1996 as
part of The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) which, at the same
time, eliminated all existing Federal assistance programs (the AFDC, in particular). The main innovations of the
TANF program were three. First, the emphasis on encouraging self-suﬃciency through work. TANF legislation
speciﬁes that, with few exceptions, recipients must participate to “work activities”, such as un-subsidized or
subsidized employment, on-the-job training, community service, job search, vocational training, or education
directly related to work.
Second, the time limit to beneﬁts: families with an adult who has received TANF assistance for a total
of ﬁve years are not eligible for further cash aid over their lifetime. A number of states, however, have also
imposed a shorter limit over ﬁxed calendar intervals (e.g., 24 months over any given 5-year period). See Moﬃtt
(2003) for a detailed description of the TANF program.
Third, ﬁnancial incentives were created for states to run mandatory active labor market programs for
workers on the TANF rolls. Generally speaking, U.S. states followed one of two alternative strategies. Some
programs emphasized short-term job search monitoring (the Labor Force Attachment approach, LFA thereafter).
Others emphasized longer-term skill-building activities and training (the Human Capital Development approach,
HCD thereafter). The programs based on the LFA approach started each worker on job-search assistance
activities (e.g., classroom instructions on resume preparation, preparation for speciﬁc job interviews, supervision
of individual workers’ search activity), and only later moved workers still on welfare into either basic education
(e.g., brush-up courses in math and reading skills, preparation for GED or high-school completion courses), or
college-level courses, or vocational training (e.g., occupational training courses in automotive repair, nursing,
clerical work, computer programming, cosmetology), usually for fairly brief periods. The programs based on
the HCD approach reverse the order of the policies, starting workers on education/training and moving them
later (but only for a short period) onto job-search monitoring. See NEWWS (2001, Box 1.2) for a more detailed
description.
Food Stamp Program: The Food Stamp program provides monthly coupons to eligible low-income
families, which can be used to purchase food. Over 80% of TANF recipients also receive Food Stamps (DHHS,
34Extended programs can be activated when unemployment is “relatively high”.
492004). Once TANF beneﬁts expire, households remain virtually without any other form of beneﬁts and have
the right to the maximum allotment of food stamps.
Unemployment Tax: The Federal Government imposes a net payroll tax on employers (FUTA) of 0:8%
on the ﬁrst $7;000 of earnings paid annually to each employee.35 States ﬁnance their welfare programs with
an additional State Unemployment Tax. In 1996, the estimated national average tax rate as a fraction of total
wages was 0:8% (House Ways and Means Committee, 1996).
EITC: The Federal Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is the major wage subsidy program in the United
States. It is a refundable tax credit that supplements the earnings of low-income workers. It has a “trapezoid”
structure as a function of annual earnings. In 1996, for a single-parent household with two children (the typical
household on the welfare rolls), the subsidy rate was 40% up to $741 per month. In the range $741 ¡$967, the
subsidy is ﬁxed at $296. For monthly earnings over $967, workers start paying a tax rate of 21% over and above
the $296 subsidy, until the break-even income such that the net subsidy is exactly zero, i.e., $2;377. See Hotz
and Scholtz (2001, Table 1) for details.
35The current gross FUTA tax is 6.2%, but employers in states meeting certain requirements are eligible for a 5.4%
tax credit.
50Figure 1
Figure 1: The policies of the optimal WTW program without training in the state space of human

















































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2: A representative history of the optimal WTW program without training policies.
52Figure 3
Figure 3: Two examples of the optimal WTW program with training in the state space of human


















































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4: A representative history of the optimal WTW program with training.
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Monthly Depreciation = 1.35%





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 6: Features of the optimal WTW program compared to the actual U.S. welfare system for a
high-skilled worker (monthly earnings of $1,500) and an low-skilled worker (monthly earnings of $600).
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